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Glen: Robert F. Kennedy and the Attorney General's Referral Authority:

ROBERT F. KENNEDY AND THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL'S REFERRAL AUTHORITY:
A BLUEPRINT FOR THE BIDEN
ADMINISTRATION
Patrick Glen*

ABSTRACT

For nearly four years, the Trump Administration's use of the
Attorney General's referralauthority has been criticized by the legal left
on both substantive and procedural grounds. With the advent of the
Biden Administration, however, use of the authority for liberal ends
deserves serious consideration; to conclude otherwise would be
throwing the baby out with the bath water. This Article argues that the
referral authority can be used for liberal constructions of the
immigration laws, and that the perfect model for the incoming
administration is former Attorney General Robert Kennedy and his use
of the authority for just such ends. Rather than continue recent
Democratic administrations' failure to utilize the authority to its full
potential, the Biden Administration should look to Kennedy for
inspiration, and implement an aggressive use of the referralauthority as
part of its immigration agenda.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Executive authority over immigration law, whether in the form of
executive orders, rule-making, or internal policy-making memoranda,
has been a consistent target of the legal and political left since nearly the

* The author is an adjunct professor at Georgetown University Law Center, and Senior
Litigation Counsel in the Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, United States
Department of Justice. The views and opinions expressed in this Article are the author's own, and
do not represent those of the federal government, the Department of Justice, or any component
thereof.
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moment President Trump was sworn into office in January of 2017.1
With a Democratic administration now set to wield that authority,
however, commentators have already begun to set an expansive agenda
2
for the Biden Administration's immigration policy. Some of this work
may be reactive, rolling back Trump-era regulations or ensuring that
proposed rules are never finalized. Some will likely constitute a
continuation of Obama Administration priorities, including revitalizing
3
the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program ("DACA") policy,
possibly reinstituting the Deferred Action for Parents of Americans
("DAPA") program,4 and promulgating comprehensive guidance on the
5
use of prosecutorial discretion by the enforcement authorities. And, of
course, the Biden Administration will seek to set its own mark on
immigration law and policy as well, using the traditional tools of the
executive branch over a potentially wide-ranging pool of
immigration-related issues.
In advancing this agenda, however, commentators mostly leave out
any mention of one of the most potent tools the executive branch may
wield in advancing its immigration policy agenda: the Attorney
6
General's referral authority. The Attorney General's referral authority
rests with a regulatory provision that allows the Attorney General to
adjudicate cases in removal proceedings, thereby establishing a uniform
interpretation of the law to guide executive branch actors in discharging

1.

See, e.g., Rachel Treisman, Democrats Slam Trump's Executive Actions, Critiquing Both
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Substance
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18/democrats-slam-trumps-executive-actions-critiquinghttps://www.npr.org/2020/08/0 /
both-substance-and-legality.
2. See Fact Sheet: President Biden Outlines Steps to Reform Our Immigration System by
Keeping Families Together, Addressing the Root Causes of IrregularMigration, and Streamlining
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System,
Immigration
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https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefmg-room/statements-releases/2021/02/02/fact-sheet-presidentbiden-outlines-steps-to-reform-our-immigration-system-by-keeping-families-together-addressingthe-root-causes-of-irregular-migration-and-streamlining-the-legal-immigration-syst.
3. See Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., to David
V. Aguilar, Acting Comm'r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., et al. 1-2 (June 15, 2012),
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/sl -exercising-prosecutorial-discretion-individuals-who-came-tous-as-children.pdf.
4. See Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., to
Leon Rodriguez, Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., et al. 1, 3 (Nov. 20, 2014),
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo.deferred_action.pdf.
5. See Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf't, to All
Field Office Directors, All Special Agents in Charge, and All Chief Counsel 1-2 (June 17, 2011),
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/procedutorial-discretion-memo.pdf.
6. See generally Alberto R. Gonzales & Patrick Glen, Advancing Executive Branch
Immigration Policy Through the Attorney General's Review Authority, 101 IOWA L. REV. 841

(2016) (explaining the Attorney General's referral authority and remarking on its powerfulness).
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their immigration-related functions. 7 Trump Administration Attorneys
General used this authority to resolve questions on a broad array of
procedural and substantive issues. Procedurally, for instance, decisions
were issued limiting the ability of the Board of Immigration Appeals
("BIA" or "the Board") and immigration judges to administratively close
cases, grant successive continuances, and assume certain aspects of an
applicant's eligibility for relief.8 Substantively, these decisions
established frameworks for considering when private harm may give rise
to asylum eligibility,9 what an applicant must demonstrate to establish a
cognizable "particular social group,"" when a criminal offense or
conviction will constitute a bar to eligibility for relief or protection, 1
and various other issues relating to bond proceedings and how or under
what circumstances applicants can carry their burden of establishing
eligibility for relief and protection under the Immigration and

Nationality Act ("INA").12
7. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h) (2020).
8. See Castro-Tum, 27 I. & N. Dec. 271, 271, 293 (A.G. 2018) (holding that the Board of
Immigration Appeals ("BIA" or "the Board") and immigration judges do not have general authority
to administratively close removal proceedings); L-A-B-R-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 405, 412 (A.G. 2018)
(clarifying the "for good cause shown" standard for granting a continuance of removal
proceedings); S-O-G- & F-D-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 462, 463 (A.G. 2018) (applying Castro-Tum and
clarifying the limited circumstances where an immigration judge may terminate or dismiss removal
proceedings); A-C-A-A-, 28 I. & N. Dec. 84, 84 (A.G. 2020) (asserting that the Board must
independently address all statutory elements relating to a grant of relief, and may not rely on
stipulations by the government).
9. A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 316, 319-20, 331 (A.G. 2018) (noting that in the context of
victims of domestic violence, an applicant must establish inability of the government to protect the
individual or that the government condoned the persecution).
10. Id. at 319, 321 (addressing the question in the context of proposed social group of "El
Salvadoran women who are unable to leave their domestic relationships where they have children in
common" with their partners); L-E-A-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 581, 581-82, 586-87, 589 (A.G. 2019)
(addressing a similar issue, but in the context of a proposed social group of the nuclear family).
11. See Thomas & Thompson, 27 I. & N. Dec. 674, 690 (A.G. 2019) (stating that state court
orders modifying a sentence to be given effect "only if based on procedural or substantive defect[s]
in the underlying criminal proceeding"); Reyes, 28 I. & N. Dec. 52, 52-54, 58-59 (A.G. 2020)
(holding that "[i]f all of the means of committing a crime, based on the elements of the statute of
conviction, amount to one or more of the offenses listed in section 101(a)(43) of the INA, then an
alien who has been convicted of that crime has necessarily been convicted of an aggravated
felony").
12. See M-S-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 509, 509-10, 512, 515-20 (A.G. 2019) (asserting that aliens
placed in expedited removal proceedings are subject to mandatory detention even if they establish a
credible fear and are transferred to removal proceedings); Castillo-Perez, 27 1. & N. Dec. 664,
664-67 (A.G. 2019) (clarifying the "good moral character" standard that must be met to establish
eligibility for cancellation of removal, and creating a presumption that two or more convictions for
driving under the influence establishes a lack of such character); R-A-F-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 778,
779-81 (A.G. 2020) (clarifying the elements for when harm constitutes "torture" for purposes of
protection under the INA's implementing regulations); O-F-A-S-, 28 I. & N. Dec. 35, 36-37 (A.G.
2020) (addressing the proper interpretation of regulations implementing the Convention Against
Torture).
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In this recourse to the referral authority, the Trump Administration
was taking a page from the work of the George W. Bush Administration,
whose three Attorneys General utilized the authority over eight years to
issue sixteen decisions with broad and continuing effect on the
13
application of the immigration laws. But these administrations were
clear outliers in the modern history of the referral authority. Throughout
the twelve years of the Reagan and first Bush Administrations, the
authority was used sparingly, while receding still further from the active
quiver of policy options in the two most recent Democrat
administrations, those of President Clinton and President Obama.
This clear disparity in the use of the authority has provided a gloss
to criticisms from the left which, while aimed ostensibly at concerns
over the authority itself, seem more concerned with the substance of the
decisions that are being reached. Addressing these criticisms is outside
the scope of this Article for two reasons. First, on their face, these
criticisms are ahistorical and fail to understand the primacy of the
Attorney General to the statutory design enacted by Congress. Second,
the meat of these criticisms has been dealt with fully elsewhere, and
nothing in the more recent academic treatment of the referral authority
provides occasion for reconsideration.
Rather, this Article seeks to put the lie to the undercurrent in many
contemporary accounts of referral that it represents a partisan project and
that its use is invariably to the detriment of the alien. Although perhaps
more true than false in its modern usage, even recent decisions have, at
times, liberalized interpretations of the immigration laws to the benefit
of applicants for relief.' 4 Even in the absence of such use, however, the
authority is inherently neutral-it provides a mechanism for the
resolution of immigration issues by the Attorney General, but does not
cabin how he or she may resolve those issues. In cases where the law is
genuinely ambiguous and thus interpretive authority may be exercised, it
is up to the Attorney General to decide the proper construction of the
statute. Based on an administration's preferences, that may well entail
strict application and interpretation of the INA. But it just as easily could
entail a liberal construction animated by humane considerations.
Although this latter possibility has not been realized in the preceding
forty years, history does provide a good example: the Kennedy
Administration and the decisions issued by Attorney General Robert F.
Kennedy.
13. See Gonzales & Glen, supra note 6, at 858; see also id. at 861-94 (noting the variety of
contexts in which Attorneys General issued decisions during the Bush Administration).
14. See, e.g., A-T-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 617, 620-621 (A.G. 2008) (rejecting the Board's
conclusion that female genital mutilation is effectively a one-time persecutory event).

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol49/iss3/5

4

Glen: Robert F. Kennedy and the Attorney General's Referral Authority:

2021]

RFK AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REFERRAL AUTHORITY

723

Between assuming office in the early part of 1961, and departing in
September 1964 on his path to the Senate, Kennedy issued eleven
immigration decisions as Attorney General. Kennedy's interpretations
were always focused on the human dimension of the case, and the need,
in light of the stakes to the individual, to provide a liberal construction
where the language of the statute was susceptible to such construction.
In other words, in circumstances where one of two interpretations was
possible, Kennedy erred on the side of providing a benefit or forestalling
removal rather than on a stricter-though still plausible and
permissible-interpretation. 1 5 At the same time, this impulse did not
permit straying beyond the text Congress enacted to implement a view
of immigration law that was not fairly traceable to the statute. Where the
language left no doubt as to its application, Kennedy applied it without
hesitation, even where it entailed harsh consequences for the alien.16
This Article proceeds in five parts. First, Part II provides a brief
overview of the history and mechanics of Attorney General referral. Part
III then turns to the decisions issued by Attorney General Kennedy in his
nearly four years at the head of the Department of Justice. In these
decisions, Kennedy was unhesitant to apply strict provisions by their
literal terms, where that coincided with the intent of Congress and
supplied the only permissible reading of the text. At the same time, in
the majority of cases, the statute provided a range of possible
permissible interpretations, and Kennedy was similarly unhesitant to
adopt the more liberal construction where the language so permitted.
These decisions were, on the whole, informed by a humane approach to
the law that prioritized liberal construction over strict construction,
where Congress entrusted interpretation to the executive branch. Part IV
advances the narrative to the two most recent Democrat administrations
and their use of the referral authority. Unlike Kennedy, no Attorney
General in the Clinton or Obama Administrations utilized the referral
authority as a component of the administration's immigration policy.
The decisions issued between 1993-2001 and 2009-2017 were largely
non-substantive and had no lasting impact on the understanding or
interpretation of the INA. Finally, Part V argues that the incoming Biden
Administration should look to the example set by Attorney General
Kennedy. Although Attorney General referral has been an important
component of advancing the policy agendas of Republican
administrations, nothing about the authority is inherently partisan. The
experience of the Kennedy Administration highlights this fact. An

15.
16.

See, e.g., K-W-S-, 9 I. & N. Dec. 396, 409 (A.G. 1961).
See, e.g., S-, 9 I. & N. Dec. 548, 555 (A.G. 1962).
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administration interested in liberalizing immigration law and policy has
a tool readily available to it in referral, and the Biden Administration
would be ill-served by following the examples of the Clinton and Obama
Administrations in failing to utilize that tool.
II.

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REFERRAL AUTHORITY: AN
OVERVIEW

"Head of Department" review has been a feature of the immigration
bureaucracy for nearly as long as that system has existed. Prior to 1940,
it was the Secretary of Labor who authorized final orders in immigration
cases, based on recommendations made to the Secretary by intermediate
17
officers, including the predecessor to the BIA. In 1940, as part of a
broader reorganization of the federal government occasioned by the
commencement of hostilities in Europe, immigration functions were
transferred "from the Department of Labor to the Department of
Justice." 18 As President Roosevelt wrote in transmitting his plan:
[T]he startling sequence of international events which has occurred
since [the submission of Reorganization Plan No. IV] has necessitated
a review of the measures required for the Nation's safety. This has
revealed a pressing need for the transfer of the immigration and
naturalization functions from the Department of Labor to the
Department of Justice.. . . I am convinced . .. that under existing
conditions the immigration and naturalization activities can best
contribute to the national well-being only if they are closely integrated
with the activities of the Department of Justice.19

It was at this point "that the [BIA] was created by regulation of the
Attorney General as a separate entity in the Department of Justice,
responsible directly to the Attorney General and completely independent
20
of the [Immigration and Naturalization] Service."
The Attorney General set the jurisdiction of the Board by
regulation, and provided that it-unlike the prior Board of Review
within the Department of Labor-could make a final adjudication of a
case rather than simply recommend a disposition to the Immigration and
21
Naturalization Service ("INS") Commissioner and the Secretary. As

17. See Maurice A. Roberts, The Board of Immigration Appeals: A Critical Appraisal, 15
SAN DIEGo L. REv. 29, 33-34 (1977).
18. Reorganization Plan No. V of 1940, 54 Stat. 1238, reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. at 104; see
Patrick Glen, Judulang v. Holder and the Future of212(c) Relief, 27 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 7 (2012).
19. 5 U.S.C. app. at 105.
20. Roberts, supra note 17, at 34.
21. See id.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol49/iss3/5

6

Glen: Robert F. Kennedy and the Attorney General's Referral Authority:

2021 ]

RFKAND THEATTORNEY GENERAL'S REFERRAL AUTHORITY

725

originally constituted, the Board functioned as a non-appellate frontline
adjudicator of cases, assisted in this task by recommendations made by
INS officials. 22 Following enactment of the INA of 1952, however,
decisions of so-called "special inquiry officers," the functional
equivalent of contemporary immigration judges, could constitute final
orders, with the Board exercising appellate jurisdiction over these
decisions in exclusion and deportation cases.23
Despite the long history of the Board, it enjoys no independent
statutory existence,24 and it has authority to act only to the extent the
Attorney General provides it with delegated authority.2 5 It was the
Attorney General alone who was statutorily charged, and remains
statutorily charged together with the Secretary of the Department of
Homeland Security, with the administration and enforcement of
immigration law. 2 6 The Board is, however, charged with exercising
independent judgment in all cases it decides, 27 and its decisions are
considered its own and not that of the Attorney General. 28 This
independence is safeguarded by the so-called Accardi principle, that the
Attorney General may not attempt to influence or dictate the decisions of
cases pending before the Board. 29
Nonetheless, since the Attorney General's delegation of authority to
the Board, the regulations have provided a mechanism for the Attorney
22. See id. at 34-35.
23. See id. at 35.
24. See Gonzales & Glen, supra note 6, at 849-51; see also Harry N. Rosenfield, Necessary
Administrative Reforms in the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 27 FORDHAM L. REV.
145,
155 (1958) (discussing how the BIA is "established by regulation").
25. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.l(d)(1) ("The Board shall function as an appellate body charged with
the review of those administrative adjudications under the Act that the Attorney General may by
regulation assign to it."); Delegation of Powers and Definition of Duties, 5 Fed. Reg. 2,454, 2,454
(Jul. 3, 1940) (stating "the Board of Review of the Immigration and Naturalization Service shall
have authority to exercise the powers of the Attorney General" in certain delineated circumstances).

26. See§ 1003.l(a), (g).
27. See § 1003.l(d)(1)(ii) ("Subject to these governing standards, Board members shall
exercise their independent judgment and discretion in considering and determining the cases coming
before the Board, and a panel or Board member to whom a case is assigned may take any action
consistent with their authorities under the Act and the regulations as is appropriate and necessary for
the disposition of the case.").
28. See, e.g., Tefel v. Reno, 972 F. Supp. 608, 613 n.1 (S.D. Fla. 1997) ("[T]he decision of
the BIA is not factually, nor legally, the decision of the Attorney General.").

29. See United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 266-67 (1954) ("In
unequivocal terms the regulations delegate to the Board discretionary authority as broad as the
statute confers on the Attorney General; the scope of the Attorney General's discretion became the

yardstick of the Board's. And if the word 'discretion' means anything as a statutory or
administrative grant of power, it means that the recipient must exercise his authority according to
his own understanding and conscience. This applies with equal force to the Board and the Attorney
General. In short, as long as the regulations remain operative, the Attorney General denies himself
the right to sidestep the Board or dictate its decision in any manner.").
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General to exercise his authority directly rather than through his
30
As originally promulgated, the
delegate-the "referral authority."
referral regulation provided:
In any case in which a dissent has been recorded; in any cases in which
the Board shall certify that a question of difficulty is involved; in any
case in which the Board orders the suspension of deportation pursuant
to the provisions of section 19(c) of the Immigration Act of 1917, as
amended, or in any case in which the Attorney General so directs, the
[BIA] shall refer the case to the Attorney General for review of the
Board's decision. In any case in which the Attorney General shall
reverse the decision of the Board, or in any case in which suspension
of deportation is ordered pursuant to the provisions of section 19(c) of
the Immigration Act of 1917, as amended, the Attorney General will
31
state in writing his conclusions and the reasons for his decision.

The regulation underwent several changes between 1940 and the present,
including clarifying who may request referral and eliminating specific
32
As currently drafted, the regulation
grounds justifying referral.

provides:
(1) The Board shall refer to the Attorney General for review of its
decision all cases that:
(i) The Attorney General directs the Board to refer to him.
(ii) The Chairman or a majority of the Board believes should be
referred to the Attorney General for review.
(iii) The Secretary of Homeland Security, or specific officials of the
Department of Homeland Security designated by the Secretary with the
concurrence of the Attorney General, refers to the Attorney General for
review.
(2) In any case the Attorney General decides, the Attorney General's
decision shall be stated in writing and shall be transmitted to the Board
or Secretary, as appropriate, for transmittal and service as provided in
33
paragraph (f) of this section.

III.

THE IMMIGRATION DECISIONS OF ROBERT F. KENNEDY

Immigration reform is intimately tied to the Kennedy political
legacy. In 1958, then Senator John F. Kennedy published his short book

30. See, e.g., Sanchez-Penunuri v. Longshore, 7 F. Supp. 3d 1136, 1149 (D. Colo. 2013)
("[A]lthough he rarely uses this power, the Attorney General is the final arbiter of the immigration
agency's interpretation of a statute."); see also Gonzales & Glen, supra note 6, at 850.
31. 8 C.F.R. § 90.12 (1940); see Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 139 n.3 (1945).
32. See Gonzales & Glen, supra note 6, at 850-52.
33. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h).
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A Nation of Immigrants, arguing, among other reform proposals, for
repealing the national-origin system that prioritized immigration from
western Europe while greatly minimizing the opportunity to emigrate
from other parts of the world. 34 As President, John F. Kennedy
championed the same reform which, following his assassination, was
taken up by Senator Edward Kennedy and the Johnson Administration.'
The result was the Immigration Act of 1965, eliminating the national
origin system and assigning visa availability on a more equitable basis. 36
And even before his presidency, John F. Kennedy was active in
advancing immigration issues in Congress, including "the Displaced
Persons Act and the Refugee Relief Act, which he sponsored while in
Congress," and a subsequent 1957 bill aimed at bringing "families
together, which he led to passage in the Senate." 37 Senator Edward
Kennedy would also go on to be the driving force behind the Refugee
Act of 1980, as well as other immigration policy initiatives in his nearly
fifty years in the United States Senate.38
Within this expansive legacy, it would be easy to lose sight of
Robert Kennedy. To be sure, he was involved in the committee hearings
on the 1965 Act and played a role in shepherding that bill through the
Senate. 39 He had earlier provided testimony as Attorney General on
immigration issues, expressing his "conviction that there are few areas in
our law which more urgently demand reform than our present unfair
system of choosing the immigrants we will allow to enter the United
States."40 But his main contribution to the Kennedy immigration legacy
lies with his exercise of the Attorney General referral authority in the
nearly four years he spent at the helm of the Department of Justice.
During that time, he decided eleven cases, significantly more than any
Attorney General since and more than even most two-term
administrations have managed to issue. His decisions evidence sympathy
for the plight of those caught up in the immigration system, and a desire
to implement humane interpretations that fairly balance congressional

34.

JOHN F. KENNEDY, A NATION OF IMMIGRANTS 74-76, 77-83 (Harper & Row rev. and

enlarged ed. 1964).
35. See generally Edward M. Kennedy, The Immigration Act of 1965, 367 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCi. 137 (1966) (explaining how President John F. Kennedy's reforms were
carried on after his assassination).
36. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (1965).
37. KENNEDY, supra note 34, at ix. For more on these acts, see Displaced Persons Act of
1948, Pub. L. No. 80-774, 62 Stat. 1009 (1948); Refugee Relief Act of 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-203, 67
Stat. 400 (1953).
38. See Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980).
39. See Kennedy, supra note 35, at 142 & n.12.
40. KENNEDY, supra note 34, at x.
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intent with the fundamentally human dimensions of the cases. This is, of
course, not to say he invariably ruled for the immigrant. He did not. But
even in cases where the law compelled a rejection of the argument raised
by the alien, Kennedy evinced a profound understanding of the stakes of
the case and the consequences that would be suffered by the individual,
even if the law left no real choice as to the imposition of those
consequences.
This Part proceeds by considering the substantive decisions issued
by Kennedy as Attorney General, grouped in subparts around a broad
issue heading: first, decisions resolving questions presented in the
context of family-based immigration; second, criminal law questions, a
nascent topic at that time; third, cases on citizenship issues and
expatriation; and fourth, cases where an alien's admissibility to the
United States was at issue, and there were arguable grounds for finding
him inadmissible based on certain misrepresentations. Although not
addressed in great detail below, Kennedy also made contributions to how
the referral authority was conceived. He noted, for instance, that referral
should be used to resolve legal questions of significant importance, not
essentially factual disputes over which reasonable minds could and did
differ. 41 And he concluded that although it is usually preferable to wait
for a Board decision resolving the legal questions raised, in certain cases
the Attorney General could accept referral prior to that resolution where
deciding the legal question does not turn on resolving any dispute as to
the particular facts in the case." These decisions are an important
component of how the referral authority has come to be understood, but
3
fall outside the scope of the instant Article.

41. See R-E-, 9 I. & N. Dec. 740, 741 (A.G. 1962) ("The only issue for decision which I find
in this case is whether, on its particular record, the majority or the dissenters are correct in their
assessment of the facts leading to the conclusion that the alien had satisfied the burden imposed
upon him. This is not ordinarily an issue appropriate for reference to me under the pertinent
regulations. The record is one upon which reasonable men can differ and have differed. Further
consideration of the question has established no general principle which could guide the disposition
of other cases, or revealed any clear error on the part of the Board.").

42. Picone, 10 I. & N. Dec. 139, 145 (A.G. 1963) ("Although it is ordinarily the better
practice to refer to the Attorney General only cases in which the Board has reached a final decision
on the merits, I am accepting this case because the legal question involved is a recurring one and its
resolution does not hinge on the particular facts shown by the record.").

43. See, e.g., Gonzales & Glen, supra note 6, at 860 (placing these decisions in the context of
how the scope of the Attorney General's referral authority has evolved and come to be understood
in practice).
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Family-Based Immigration

The possibilities of a humanitarian-based interpretation of the INA
are nowhere more apparent than in Kennedy's opinions dealing with
family-based immigration issues. As Attorney General, Kennedy issued
three decisions on a range of issues pertaining to whether or in what
circumstances an alien was entitled to pursue lawful admission to the
United States. In each case, where either of two competing
interpretations would have been a reasonable construction of the
statutory language, Kennedy opted for the more liberal and permissive
approach.
The INA established a category of non-quota immigrants, outside
the numerical limitations otherwise applicable to aliens seeking to
immigrate, defined as an individual "who is the child or the spouse of a
citizen of the United States.""4 The INA in turn defined "child" to mean,
inter alia, "an unmarried person under twenty-one years of age who
is ... a child adopted while under the age of fourteen years if the child
has thereafter been in the legal custody of, and has resided with, the
adopting parent or parents for at least two years."4' If there are two
adopting parents, does the residency requirement apply as to both?
Attorney General Herbert Brownell initially answered yes, disallowing
non-quota status to the child of a United States citizen who had resided
more than two years with his adoptive mother, but less than two years
with his adoptive father.4 6 Brownell interpreted the defmition of "child"
"to require that the [two]-year legal custody and residence of the adopted
child be had with both the adoptive parents, where [two] exist or with
one when the family unit consists of only one adoptive parent."4 7 The
interpretation was justified, according to Brownell, by congressional
purpose: "[I]t is restoration of a bona fide family relationship which is
the Congressional objective," and that objective would not be served
where the family relationship never existed.4 8
Brownell's decision was the subject of significant litigation in the
federal courts, with most rejecting his construction of the statute. 49
Representative of these decisions was the Southern District of New
York's opinion in Ng Fun Yin, holding that non-quota status was
44. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (codified in
U.S.C.).
45. 8 U.S.C. §1 101(b)(1)(E) (1958) (emphasis added).
46. See C-F-L-, 8 I. & N. Dec. 151, 165-66 (A.G. 1959).
47. Id. at 166.
48. See id. ("These provisions are remedial in nature and were enacted by Congress to reunite
an adopted child with his parents where a bona fide family relationship has been interrupted.").
49. See Y-K-W-, 9 I. & N. Dec. 176, 177-79 (A.G. 1961).
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required where the adoptive mother, but not the adoptive father, had met
the two-year residency requirement:
I believe that general purpose [of fostering continued bona fide family
relationships] can be implemented only by granting plaintiff's adopted
son non-quota status. There is no doubt whatsoever that plaintiff and
his wife have . .. had a bona fide family relationship. There is also no
doubt that plaintiff's wife and plaintiffs adopted child have had .. . a
bona fide family relationship. The only way in which these two
relationships can be maintained is to allow all three of the individuals
50
involved to maintain a single residence.

Reviewing the issue in a subsequent case, Kennedy focused on the
legislative history that, although sparse, "provide[d] support for a liberal
5
interpretation of the statutory language." ' Kennedy did agree with
aspects of Brownell's construction, concurring that the statute was meant
to serve a remedial purpose and "to prevent hardship in cases where the
child is chargeable to a heavily oversubscribed quota and would not
52
otherwise be able to accompany his adoptive parents." In effectuating
that purpose, however, it was the interpretation of Ng Fun Yin that
53
should control, not Brownell's opinion in C-F-L-. According to
Kennedy, "the requirement of the statute that legal custody and
residence be had with 'the adopting parent or parents' is satisfied if had
4
with only one of the adopting parents for the requisite two years."
Moreover, Kennedy opined that adequate safeguards remained in place
to prevent fraud or abuse of the provision, as adjudicators could look "at
the surrounding circumstances of the adoption and mak[e] a
determination on the facts that, assuming the statutory qualifications to
be met, the legislative purposes would be served in a particular case.""
In other words, in cases where there is evidence of fraud in attempting to
procure the non-quota status for a child, the government would be
56
entitled to rely on the fraud and deny status. That not being the case as
regarded Y-K-W-, the Attorney General granted non-quota status.
50. Ng Fun Yin v. Esperdy, 187 F. Supp. 51, 53-54 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
51. Y-K-W-, 9 I. & N. Dec. at 179.
52. Id. (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 1057, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 4).
53. Id. at 179-80.
54. Id. at 180.
55. Id.
56. See id. ("[T]here has been no challenge to the bona fides of the family relationships
involved. The validity of the marriage of the parents and the adoption of the child are unquestioned.
Nor is any question raised as to whether the child was in the legal custody of and resided with the
wife for the required period. There is, therefore, no evidence of fraud. The remedial and
humanitarian purpose of section 101(b)(1)(E) would not be applicable in any future case in which
such evidence is present.").
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In K-W-S-, Kennedy was confronted with the question of whether
an alien was entitled to fourth-preference status as the brother of a
United States citizen.57 The statute provided such preference-status to
siblings, whether by full or half-blood, but had different rules for
qualifying siblings under the half-blood rubric depending on who the
common parent was: "Where the common parent is the mother, the
offspring are regarded as half brother and half sister, whether or not
legitimate .... [W]here the common parent is the father but different
mothers are involved, the illegitimate child is not eligible for fourth
preference as a half brother or sister" automatically.5 8 Rather, in such
circumstances, "it becomes necessary for the petitioner to establish that
the beneficiary is a legitimate half brother." 59 The petitioner sought
fourth-preference status for her half-brother, who was the offspring of
the same father, but a different mother-the concubine of the father.60
Reviewing relevant Chinese law, the Board determined that children of
concubines are not considered to be illegitimate, and can be "legitimate"
based on acknowledgment by the father of the child.6' Accordingly, the
Board "approve[d] the visa petition with the admonition that the consul,
in view of the absence of documents, [could] require additional evidence
before he is satisfied as to relationship and identity."6 2 The Board held to
this view in a subsequent decision, despite motions by the INS and the
Department of State arguing that its holding was contrary to public
policy. 63 In rejecting the government's submissions, the Board again
relied on the law of the domicile and residence of the father to gauge
legitimacy, noting that "a child . .. that is legitimate in the place of his
birth is legitimate everywhere."6 The child being considered legitimate
in China, the Board held to its prior interpretation, but referred the case
to the Attorney General based on the concerns raised by the Department
of State. 65
On review, Kennedy accepted the fact of Chinese law and that the
beneficiary was a legitimate child under that law. 66 Turning to the INA,
57. K-W-S-, 9 I. & N. Dec. 396, 396 (A.G. 1961).
58. Id. at 397.
59. Id. (emphasis added).
60. Id. at 396-97.
61. Id. at 398-400.
62. Id. at 400.
63. See id. at 401, 404-05 (noting that the Departments have "asked that the decision be
reconsidered on the grounds that it offends public policy and is contrary to long-standing rulings of
the Department").

64.
65.
66.
between

Id. at 404.
See id. at 407.
Id. at 408 ("These findings as to Chinese law and as to the facts relating to the relationship
the petitioner, the beneficiary and their parents, are not contested.").
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Kennedy wrote that the statutory definition of "child" and the preference
categories generally were both enacted "to implement 'the
well-established policy of maintaining the family unit wherever
possible."' 67 Echoing the rationale from his earlier decision in Y-K-W-,
Kennedy reasoned that "[s]ympathetic and humane considerations
dictate an interpretation which would not separate the child, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, from its alien parent," a rule that would apply
equally to other familial relationships, including "the case of a half
brother or half sister, born out of wedlock, who desires to confer
68
preferential immigrant status under" the INA. Extending preference
status in this circumstance may not have been compelled by the statute,
but "it would appear to be a desirable result, based upon legal and
equitable considerations, to adopt a liberal construction. No harm could
possibly result from such a construction, and the consequences would
fulfill the humane considerations involved in keeping intact the family
unit."69 The Attorney General also rejected the public policy
considerations proffered by the Department of State for declining to
recognize such children. First, on its own terms, Kennedy concluded that
the INA already provided sufficient bases to deny benefits to individuals
who were themselves engaged in polygamy. 70 Second, regardless of
policy concerns over relationships with multiple partners or spouses,
there was no public policy reason for denying the offspring of those
relationships appropriate status under the INA. 71 This was especially so,
according to Kennedy, where
Congress deems it more in accordance with humanitarian principles to
try to keep together those offspring of a common parent who have
lived together as a family unit in accordance with the established laws
and institutions of their place of residence, regardless of whether or not
those laws are in conformity with our own social and family
institutions.72

A similarly perplexing issue was subsequently presented in the
context of third-preference category visas, which were available to "the
spouses or children of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent

67. Id. at 409 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 39).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. See id. at 410.
71. Id.
72. See id. at 409-10 ("1 cannot attribute to a Congress thus solicitous for keeping together
those persons who have in fact lived together as a family an intention to deny fourth preference
status to children who were regarded as legitimate brothers and sisters under the law of their own
and their parent's residence.").
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residence." 73 A lawful permanent resident filed a visa petition on behalf
of his son, which was approved on January 31, 1958.74 That category
was oversubscribed, however, so no visa was available to him as of that
date. 75 Although placed on the waiting list, he aged out of "child" status
on June 2, 1959, when he obtained the age of majority. 76 He was thus
automatically removed from the waiting list by operation of law. 77
In September 1959, Congress acted to enlarge the third-preference
category to include "unmarried sons or daughters" of lawful permanent
residents-that is children over the age of twenty-one. 78 That Act,
applicable prospectively only in terms of visa petitions, nonetheless
contained two exceptions to extend non-quota immigrant status to
certain eligible individuals with visa petitions approved prior to January
1, 1959.79 Each exception contained the same proviso, however: it
applied only if "upon his application for an immigrant visa, and for his
admission into the United States, the alien is found to have retained his
relationship to the petitioner, and status, as established in the approved
petition."8 0 The focal point was "status" and what "status" must have
been retained. 81 The INS argued that the relevant status was marital
status, not age, and thus had approved the petition for non-quota status. 82
The Department of State, however, believed that the relevant status was
both age and marital status, which meant that the beneficiary did not
qualify for either exception. 83 The Board, on review, held that status
referred to consanguinity only, and approved the petition.84
The Attorney General disagreed with the reasoning, but not with
the bottom line. He concluded that "[t]he purpose of sections 4 and 6 of
the 1959 Act was to reunite families and to relieve a backlog resulting
from oversubscribed quotas which cause unusually long delays in the
issuance of immigration quota visas for aliens already accorded
preference status." 85 In light of the intent behind the Act, the most
logical meaning of "status" related to the "preference quota status" to

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(2).
Y-J-G-, 9 I. & N. Dec. 471, 472 (A.G. 1961).
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing 8 C.F.R. § 206.1(b)(5) (1957)).
Id. at 472, 474.
Id. at 472-74 (citing Act of Sept. 22, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-365, 73 Stat. 646 (1959)).
Id. at 473 (emphasis added).
Id. at 473-74.
Id. at 473.
Id. at 473-74.
Id. at 474.
Id. (citing 105 CONG. REC. 12,716 (1959)); 105 CONG. REC. 18,996 (1959)).
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86
which both sections explicitly referred. The contrary interpretations
were not compelling. The Board's construction would make the term
"status" superfluous, since both sections already required retention of the
7
qualifying relationship.8 In contrast, the Department of State's
interpretation placed too great an emphasis on the facts that contribute to
88
the status, including marital status and age, rather than the status itself.
Although the beneficiary's status did change between aging out of child
status in June 1959 and the expansion of the preference category in
September 1959, the relevant status-qualifier for third-preference
category status-was reinstated by the 1959 Act, which "restored [the]
previous status." 89 In other words, the status of the beneficiary was at all
times that of an individual eligible for third-preference category status,
and it was that status that was "retained" via reinstatement by the 1959
Act.90
In each of these cases, there were at least two reasonable ways to
resolve the issue. In Y-K-W-, it would have been reasonable to read the
statute as requiring an adopted child to be in the legal custody and reside
with both parents for the required two-year period, an interpretation
arguably supported by the intent of Congress in providing for
9
reunification of separated family units. 1 Public policy could well have
supported the stricter interpretation offered by the Department of State in
K-W-S-, whereby the children of concubines would be outside the scope
of "relatives" for purposes of allocating visas under the preference
categories. 92 Likewise, the narrower interpretation advanced by the
Department of State in Y-J-G- was not on its face erroneous, and the
generous benefit of non-quota status could well have been meant only
for those then eligible for classification within the appropriate preference
category in line with Congress's intent to ease oversubscribed waiting
lists. 93 In other words, nothing in these cases compelled the decision
ultimately issued by Attorney General Kennedy.
Instead, Kennedy consciously adopted a liberal construction of the
94
Both Y-K-W- and
provisions in line with humanitarian principles.

86. Id. at 474-75.
87. Id. at 475.
88. See id. at 476.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 476-77 ("It is enough that, as in this case, eligibility existed at the time the petition
was approved and exists at the time of application for an immigrant visa and for admission into the
United States.").
91. Y-K-W-, 9 I. & N. Dec. 176, 177-79 (B.I.A. 1961).
92. K-W-S-, 9 I. & N. Dec. 396, 400-01 (A.G. 1961).
93. Y-J-G-, 9 I. & N. Dec. at 473-74, 476.
94. K-W-S-, 9 I. & N. Dec. at 409; Y-J-G-, 9 I. & N. Dec. at 475-77.
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K-W-S- rested on the principle of family unity-that families should be
able to live together in the United States, and that any interpretation
ending with that result should be preferred if otherwise reasonable under
the statutory language. 95 Family unity also played a role in Y-J-G-, but a
strong current of equity also pervades the opinion. 96 The beneficiary's
visa petition had been approved, and the only reason he had not been
able to immigrate was because of the oversubscription of that preference
category. 97 His aging out was in no real sense his own fault, and it was
that sequence of events that suddenly placed him on the outside of the
system looking in. Congress acted to address that inequity by enacting
the exceptions in the 1959 Act to provide non-quota status to individuals
with previously approved visa petitions, and reading those provisions
broadly to include individuals whose status lapsed priorto enactment of
the 1959 Act was in service of that goal. 98 These decisions, as much as
any issued by Kennedy, establish the space an Attorney General retains
to act for the benefit of the alien. 99 To be sure, not every provision is
fairly susceptible to a liberalizing interpretation, but there is no shortage
of provisions that are. When confronted with the opportunity in the
context of family-related immigration issues, Kennedy never failed to
capitalize and advance his humane vision of the law.
B.

CriminalLaw Questions

Kennedy resolved only one criminal law-related question during his
tenure, involving an issue that has engaged numerous Attorneys General
in the preceding eighty years: the immigration consequences of state and
federal post-conviction relief schemes.100
The INA provided that "[alny alien ... who at any time after entry
is convicted of two crimes involving moral turpitude, not arising out of a
single scheme of criminal misconduct, regardless of whether confined
therefor and regardless of whether the convictions were in a single trial"
is deportable.1 01 The Act also provided that such an alien shall not be
deported "if the court sentencing such alien for such crime shall make, at
the time of first imposing judgment or passing sentence ... a

&

95. Y-K-W-, 9 I. & N. Dec. at 178; K-W-S-, 9 I. & N. Dec. at 408-09.
96. Y-J-G-, 9 I. & N. Dec. at 475-76.
97. Id. at 472.
98. Id. at 475-76.
99. See K-W-S-, 9 I. & N. Dec. at 409-10; Y-K-W-, 9 I. & N. Dec. at 179-180; Y-J-G-, 9 I.
N. Dec. at 476-77.
100. P-, 9 I. & N. Dec. 293, 293-94 (A.G. 1961); see Gonzales & Glen, supra note 6, at 868-70
(reviewing the long history of Attorney General decisions on expungement and related issues).
101. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(4).
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recommendation to the Attorney General that such alien not be
deported. ... "102 An alien was convicted of two offenses, both of which
10 3
At his
were conceded to be crimes involving moral turpitude.
against
recommendation
judicial
no
1959,
sentencing in March
filed a
subsequently
alien
deportation was made by the judge.104 The
petition for a writ of coram nobis and motion for a new trial, which was
105
He was again convicted, but "[a]t this
granted by the trial court.
against his deportation."106 The
recommended
second trial the court
Board, however, refused to give effect to this second proceeding,
holding that it was the initial March 1959 entry of judgment that was
relevant under § 1251(b), and that because "the vacation and reentry of
judgment was for the sole purpose of petitioning the court to make the
statutory recommendation against deportation," it "was not timely and
07
was ineffectual."1
On referral to the Attorney General, the question was framed as to
"whether the recommendation of the court against deportation satisfies
the requirement of [§ 1251(b)] that to be effective it must be made 'at
the time of first imposing judgment or passing sentence."'108 The
Attorney General noted that Second Circuit precedent had held that the
writ of coram nobis would not be effectual for such purposes "where the
sole basis for the vacation and reentry of judgment is to repair the
omission to make the statutory recommendation against deportation
09
permitted by § 1251(b)."1 As that court reasoned, "[t]o hold otherwise
would be to defeat the plain command of the statute, which strictly, and
for good purpose, limits the time within which the extraordinary power
0
vested in the trial court must be exercised."" The Attorney General
accepted this holding, but concluded that the Board had erred in focusing
on the alien's asserted motivation for pursuing the writ, rather than the
court's in granting the writ."' First, the petition itself requested relief on
two grounds unrelated to the judicial-recommendation issue: a lack of
2
counsel and a lack of adequate translation." Second, it was those two

102. § 1251(b) (emphasis added).
103. P-, 9 I. & N. Dec. at 293; P-, 8 I. & N. Dec. 689, 689-90 (B.I.A. 1960).
104. P-, 9 I. & N. Dec. at 293-94.
105. Id. at 293-95; P-, 8 I. & N. Dec. at 690.
106. P-, 9 I. & N. Dec. at 294.
107. P-, 8 I. & N. Dec. at 692.
108. P-, 9 I. & N. Dec. at 294.
109. Id. (quoting United States a rel. Piperkoff v. Esperdy, 267 F.2d 72, 75 (2d Cir. 1959))
(emphasis added).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 295.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol49/iss3/5

18

Glen: Robert F. Kennedy and the Attorney General's Referral Authority:

2021]

RFK AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REFERRAL AUTHORITY

737

bases that were the focus of the court's hearing on the petition, and the
state district attorney had concurred that substantial questions had been
raised by the petition.1 3 Given the content of the petition and the
professed motivation of the court in granting the writ, the Attorney
General had "no difficulty in concluding that the opportunity to
recommend against deportation was not the court's 'sole basis' for
vacating the March 1959 conviction."1 4 As it was permissible to look to
the October 1959 sentencing and judicial recommendation against
deportation entered at that time, the Attorney General held that the
statutory requirement was fulfilled and cancelled the deportation. 1 I
Kennedy's opinion took a functional approach to a question with
high stakes consequences for the alien. Examining the arguments raised
in the petition holistically, and giving a limiting interpretation to the
Second Circuit's opinion in Piperkoff v. Esperdy, Kennedy announced a
rule that was to guide subsequent adjudicators in confronting similar
post-conviction issues: where there is a constitutional or legal defect in
the underlying proceeding, a grant of post-conviction relief will be
effective for immigration purposes. 16 In contrast, where the vacatur or
relief is solely for the purposes of addressing the immigration
consequences of the prior conviction or for other rehabilitative (i.e.,
non-substantive) purposes, the conviction will stand for immigration
purposes. 1 7
C.

Citizenship and Expatriation

Citizenship and expatriation were major issues of litigation
throughout the 1950s and 1960s, culminating in a series of decisions
before the Supreme Court.1 8 Kennedy himself confronted two such
cases during his tenure as Attorney General.

113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. See id. at 294; see also Ibarra-Obando, 12 I. & N. Dec. 588, 589-90 (A.G. 1967).
117. See Marroquin-Garcia, 23 I. & N. Dec. 705, 713-17 (A.G. 2005); Luviano-Rodriguez, 23
I. & N. Dec. 718, 720-21 (A.G. 2005); see also Roldan, 22 . & N. Dec. 512, 520-23 (B.I.A. 1999).
118. See, e.g., Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 266-68 (1961) (addressing a
denaturalization proceeding); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 87-91 (1958) (addressing an action for a
declaration of nationality following military desertion); Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129, 130-33
(1958) (addressing the same, in context of service in a foreign military); United States v. Zucca, 351
U.S. 91, 91-93 (1956) (addressing a denaturalization proceeding based on membership in the
Communist Party); United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 529-31 (1955) (addressing a petition
for naturalization); Shomberg v. United States, 348 U.S. 540, 541 (1955) (addressing the same);
Mandoli v. Acheson, 344 U.S. 133, 134-35 (1952) (addressing an action against the Department of
State for a declaration of citizenship).
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The INA provided that a person "who is a national of the United
States whether by birth or naturalization, shall lose his nationality
by. .. voting in a political election in a foreign state or participating in
an election or plebiscite to determine the sovereignty over foreign
territory."'19 The statute additionally provided for an irrebuttable
presumption:
Any person who commits or performs any act specified in subsection
(a) of this section shall be conclusively presumed to have done so
voluntarily and without having been subjected to duress of any kind, if
such person at the time of the act was a national of the state in which
the act was performed and had been physically present in such state for
a period or periods totaling ten years or more immediately prior to
such act. 120

C-S- was born in Cuba to a father who was a United States citizen
at birth, and thus C-S- himself "had a colorable claim to United States
12 1
citizenship at birth" under then governing law. Unfortunately, he was
unaware of this potential claim until October 1959, when he was
pursuing a visa.1 2 2 Before he learned of this possibility, he voted in
23
The Board nonetheless
elections for Cuba's national Senate.1
terminated proceedings against him, noting that it had previously held
"that a citizen of the United States could not lose United States
citizenship by committing an act which would otherwise be the basis for
a loss of citizenship, if, at the time the act was committed, he had no
124
Applying
knowledge that he had a claim to United States citizenship."
that rule resolved the case, since "where action was taken without
knowledge that United States citizenship existed, the circumstances
under which the [statutory] presumption was intended to operate do not
2
exist."1
The INS sought reconsideration, but the Board denied the
motion.1 26 The Service argued that the INA was enacted with knowledge
of court cases "allegedly preclud[ing] the possibility of exempting a
person who committed an act of expatriation without knowing that he
12 7
But as the Board noted in denying the
was a United States citizen."

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(5).
§ 1481(b).
C-S-, 9 I. & N. Dec. 670, 670-71 (A.G. 1962).
Id. at 671.
Id.
Id. at 671-72 (citing C-A-, 9 I. & N. Dec. 482, 483-85 (B.I.A. 1961)).
Id.
Id. at 672, 674-75.
Id. at 674.
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motion, all cases cited by the government involved situations where the
individual knew of their citizenship, the knowledge that was lacking in
C-S-'s own case. 12 8
The Attorney General agreed to review the case, but upheld
termination of proceedings. He first held that § 1481(b) is only relevant
to questions of voluntariness and duress, and "[h]ence ... has no
application to a case such as the present in which the acts were
performed voluntarily but without knowledge of the individual's United
States citizenship."12 9 In any event, if there was ambiguity in the statute,
it should be resolved against expatriation: "The Supreme Court has
emphasized that, where deprivation of the 'precious right of citizenship'
is involved, 'the facts and the law should be construed as far as is
reasonably possible in favor of the citizen.'"13 0 "In the absence of clear
and compelling statutory language," Kennedy was "unwilling to
attribute to Congress an intention that the United States citizenship of an
individual should be forfeited by reason of actions taken at a time when
he was unaware of his citizenship.""
A subsequent case, Picone, entailed a less beneficial result for the
alien, even as Kennedy again announced a fairly liberal construction of
the statute.132 The case concerned the interplay of United States law
governing expatriation and Italian law governing the reacquisition of
nationality.133 United States law provided that "any American citizen
shall be deemed to have expatriated himself when he has been
naturalized in any foreign state in conformity with its laws, or when he
has taken an oath of allegiance to any foreign state." 134 Italian law
provided that "[t]here shall be recovery of Italian citizenship by one who
having ceased to be an Italian citizen owing to the acquisition of foreign
citizenship, has been resident in the kingdom for two years." 135 Picone's
father had been naturalized in the United States, and Picone thus sought
a passport based on his assertion that he was a United States citizen by
birth.1 36 After the father's naturalization in 1922, however, he had
returned to Italy and remained there from December 1925 through his

128. Id.
129. Id. at 675-76.
130. Id. at 676-77 (quoting Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129, 134 (1958)) (reviewed by Att'y
Gen.).
131. Id.
132. See Picone, 10 I. & N. Dec. 145, 148-49, 153 (A.G. 1963).
133. Id. at 139-41.
134. Expatriation Act of 1907, ch. 2534, § 2, 34 Stat. 1228, 1228 (repealed 1940).
135. Picone, 10 I. & N. Dec. at 139 (citing Legge 13 giugno 1912, n. 555, G.U. June 30, 1912,
n. 153 (It.)).
136. Id. at 145-46.
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death in 1958.137 Picone was born in 1932, thus after the father's return
to Italy and after the Italian law resulted in a de jure imposition of Italian
citizenship. 138 Additionally, facts were adduced to the effect that the
father held no property in the United States, paid no taxes to the United
States while paying taxes to the Italian government, held an Italian
identity card, and definitely voted in national elections in 1951 and
1952, and likely in other elections dating as far back as 1934.139
The Department of the State took the position that "as a matter of
law, a person cannot become expatriated under a law which makes him a
foreign national solely by operation of law, although there are overt acts
voluntarily performed which may be regarded as acceptance of the
foreign nationality."140 The Board and INS rejected this extreme
construction in favor of the "long standing" position of the government,
that "acquisition of Italian nationality" does not cause loss of United
States citizenship, "unless the individual manifested a voluntary
acceptance of Italian nationality by declaration, or overt act such as
accepting employment by the Italian [g]overnment, accepting an Italian
passport or identity card, voting in Italy, or joining an Italian political
party." 4 1 The case was referred to the Attorney General for
consideration of the legal issue:
[W]hether to adhere to the long-standing administrative view that
voluntary acceptance of naturalization obtained by operation of law
results in expatriation under the Act of 1907 or to adopt the conclusion
of the Department of State that in such circumstances the voluntary act
cannot result in expatriation unless the act itself is specifically made an
142
expatriating act by the statute.

Kennedy was required to walk a tightrope in interpreting the
provision: United States law "should not be interpreted in such a way as
to make it a trap for the unwary," caught by a foreign legal regime that
14 3
But
automatically imposed citizenship based on extended residency.
the statutory language still placed limits on the breadth of any liberal
interpretation, and there was no bar to applying the expatriation
provision to naturalizations that occurred by operation of law."
Residence alone, according to the Attorney General, should not be a
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Idat 145.
Id. at 145-46.
Id. at 140.
Id. at 143.
Id. at 142.
Id. at 148.
Id. at 149.
Id. at 150.
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sufficient basis for concluding that expatriation had occurred, except for
the rare case where the individual evinced an intent to accept the foreign
nationality at the point the residence commenced.14 5 The more difficult
question was that posed by Picone's case-whether naturalization by
operation of law, coupled with acts constituting a voluntary acceptance
of that naturalization, was sufficient to fmd expatriation. Kennedy
concluded that this was sufficient:
It is true, of course, that 'rights of citizenship are not to be destroyed
by an ambiguity,' but when a United States citizen becomes
naturalized by operation of law in a foreign country and by his
subsequent course of conduct clearly manifests an intention to accept
the rights and obligations that go with his new nationality, I do not
believe that it does violence to the language of the Act of 1907 to hold
that he has expatriated himself, notwithstanding that the tender of a
new status under foreign law and its acceptance by the individual do
not occur contemporaneously. 146

In so holding, however, Kennedy rejected the idea that acceptance
should relate back in time to the commencement of the residency in the
foreign country. Rather, "the act indicating acceptance of Italian
nationality was probative only of intent at the time the act was
performed," and thus that expatriation "should date from the act of
acceptance." 147 Proceedings were remanded to assess the timeline and
evidence in Picone's own case, to determine when expatriation may
have occurred.14 8
In both cases, Kennedy selected a reasonable interpretation of the
statute that gave effect to the text, while erring on the side of the
claimant. An awareness of the significance of the act being undertaken,
or at least the voluntariness of the act itself in circumstances where the
individual was reaping a benefit, was required. Loss of citizenship, or
the inability to obtain U.S. citizenship by a child, could not be made to
turn on anything less.
D. Admissibility andMateriality of Misrepresentations
Attorney General Kennedy decided three cases implicating the
scope of the INA's inadmissibility provision relating to fraud in entry or
the procurement of immigration documentation. Although often
involving fact-intensive inquiries in application, Kennedy established
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

150-52.
152.
151.
153.
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baseline legal principles to govern the assessment of materiality,
focusing on the ultimate question of whether the applicant would have
nonetheless established eligibility for admission in the absence of the
misrepresentation.
The first decision, issued soon after becoming Attorney General,

involved consolidated cases under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(19), which
rendered inadmissible and ineligible for a visa "[a]ny alien who seeks to
procure, or has sought to procure, or has procured a visa or other
documentation, or seeks to enter the United States, by fraud, or by
14 9
In the case of S-, the alien
willfully misrepresenting a material fact."
had concealed his membership in the Communist Party in order to
procure a visa, but this had been found to be immaterial because his
membership was "involuntary" and thus would not have constituted an
150
The Board upheld this
independent ground of excludability.
determination, applying the rule that "a misrepresentation is not
material, when made during proceedings for admission into the United
States, if the alien would not have been denied a visa or excluded had he
told the truth."" In the case of B-C-, the alien had procured multiple
52
documents for himself and his wife using his nephew's identity.
Exclusion was upheld, because "[i]n identity cases, a misrepresentation
is always material; that is, the misrepresentation is material whether or
53
not the alien gained any substantial benefit by it."'
Given a lack of clarity and some inconsistency in gauging
materiality, the Attorney General referred the cases to himself for "a
re-examination of the principles which should govern the disposition of
15 4
Basing his approach on an
such cases by the [e]xecutive [b]ranch."
attempt to issue a decision "most consonant with the purposes and
policies of the [INA],""' Kennedy noted that construing this provision
required him to balance "'fair humanitarian standards' . . . with the need
56
He first rejected the rule that
to 'prevent the evasion of law by fraud."
a misrepresentation or fraud is material only if it goes to the
57
excludability of the applicant.1 That rule "would deny subsection (19)
any effect as an independent ground of exclusion, since in every case the
alien would be excludable because of the existence of other grounds of
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

S- & B-C-, 9 I. & N. Dec. 436, 444 (A.G. 1961).
Id. at 437.
Idat 438 (citing G-M-, 7 I. & N. Dec. 40, 74 (A.G. 1956)).
Id. at 441-42.
Id. at 442.
Id. at 444.
Id. at 446.
Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 82-2096, at 128 (1952)).
Id. at 446-47.
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exclusion and the fact that he made false statements would add
nothing."" Second, he rejected the distinction between fraud or
misrepresentation in identity, and other forms of fraud and
misrepresentation, concluding that "[o]n principle, I see no valid basis
for distinguishing between different types of misrepresentations and for
applying a special rule to cases involving identity."159
In Kennedy's opinion, materiality should depend on two factors:
first, whether "the alien is excludable on the true facts," and second,
whether "the misrepresentation tend[ed] to shut off a line of inquiry
which is relevant to the alien's eligibility and which might well have
resulted in a proper determination that he be excluded."160 If the answer
to the first question is "yes," then the misrepresentation was material.161
If the answer to the second question is "no," then the misrepresentation
was not material. 162 If "yes," however, the adjudicator should then ask
whether the inquiry, had it occurred, might have "resulted in a proper
determination that the alien be excluded." 163 This inquiry would be fact
dependent. In the cases at bar, Kennedy split in his application of
materiality: S- was excludable, since omission of his Communist Party
membership cut off a relevant line of inquiry, including a more detailed
assessment of whether that membership was undertaken involuntarily or
out of a sense of necessity, that would likely have affected the
determination of admissibility.1" B-C- was not excludable, as he was
more likely than not admissible under his own name, and thus the use of
his nephew's name in the procurement of documentation did not shut off
a line of inquiry that may have otherwise produced a determination of

inadmissibility. 165

Kennedy applied S- & B-C- in a subsequent case, which also
presented the issue of whether a materiality determination made in a
parallel criminal proceeding was dispositive of the materiality issue in
the inadmissibility context. 1"6
Martinez-Lopez applied for a visa with a legitimate letter of support
from a brother legally resident in the United States, and a fraudulent
letter offering employment in the United States, which unknown to the
applicant was also a forgery (although he knew there was no real offer of
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Id. at 446.
Id. at 447-48.
Id. at 447.
Id. at 448.
Id.at 448-49.
Id. at 449.
Id. at 450.
Id. at 450-51.
Martinez-Lopez, 10 I. & N. Dec. 409,410 (A.G. 1964).
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employment). 167 This scheme was uncovered, and Martinez-Lopez,
along with his brother and a cousin, were convicted of violating 18

U.S.C. § 1001, which provided:
[W]hoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of the executive,
legislative, or judicial branch of the United States, knowingly and
willfully - (1) falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick, scheme,
or device a material fact; (2) makes any material false, fictitious, or
fraudulent statements or representations; or (3) makes or uses any false
writing or document knowing the same to contain any materially false,
fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry; shall be fined under this
title, imprisoned not more than 5 years .... 168

In order to convict, the government had to prove-and did prove-the
69
materiality of the misrepresentation and fraud.1 Martinez-Lopez was
subsequently charged with deportability as an alien excludable at the
time of admission under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(19), based on fraud or
misrepresentation.17 1 In so charging Martinez-Lopez, the INS argued
that the resolution of the materiality question in the criminal proceeding
definitely established the materiality of the misrepresentation for
purposes of the immigration laws.
Kennedy disagreed. He started from the premise that
determinations of deportation and exclusion are the exclusive purview of
the INS by law. 171 According to Kennedy, there was then "a basis for the
argument that in the instant case the judicial finding of materiality could
not, as a matter of law, relieve the special inquiry officer from his duty
17 2
Regardless of
of making an independent determination of materiality."
that independent obligation, however, "there was no true identity of
173
An
issues in the criminal case and the deportation proceeding."
meaning
same
the
had
materiality
if
identity of issues would occur only
17 4
under both the criminal code and the immigration laws. Materiality, as
used in 18 U.S.C. § 1001, addressed only "whether the misrepresentation
was 'calculated to induce action or reliance by an agency of the United

167. Id. at 409-10.
168. Id. at 412; 18 U.S.C. § 1001.
169. Martinez-Lopez, 10 I. & N. Dec. at 424.
170. See 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (1952).
171. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1957); Martinez-Lopez, 10 1. & N. Dec. at 419-20.
172. Martinez-Lopez, 10 I. & N. Dec. at 419-20.
173. Id. at 420.
174. Id. at 420-21 ("The determination in the criminal case to the effect that the work offer was
'material' might be considered to be binding in the deportation proceedings only if the word
'material' has the same meaning in prosecutions under 18 U.S.C. [§] 1001 as in deportation
proceedings .... ").
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States."'17 5 Materiality under the INA was distinct, as the Attorney
General had previously clarified in S- & B-C-. Applying that test,
Kennedy concluded that the misrepresentation was not material. Under
the true facts, Martinez-Lopez would not have been excludable on any
basis, including that of being a "public charge." 176 And although the
misrepresentation did have the effect of shutting "off a line of inquiry
relevant to his eligibility for a visa," it did not appear that any such
inquiry "would have resulted in a proper determination that the
respondent was excludable." 17 7
Finally, in S-, Kennedy addressed the interplay between
excludability under the statute based on fraud and the statute of
limitations
governing the
Attorney General's
rescission of
adjustment-of-status. 178 Congress provided a route to permanent
residency for an alien previously admitted to the United States:
The status of an alien ... may be adjusted by the Attorney
General ... to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent
residence if (1) the alien makes an application for such adjustment, (2)
the alien is eligible to receive an immigrant visa and is admissible to
the United States for permanent residence, and (3) an immigrant visa is
immediately available to him at the time his application is filed. 179

The statute also provided for rescission of a previously granted
adjustment:
If, at any time within five years after the status of a person has been
otherwise adjusted under the provisions of section 1255 or 1259 of this
title ... it shall appear to the satisfaction of the Attorney General that
the person was not in fact eligible for such adjustment of status, the
Attorney General shall rescind the action taken granting an adjustment
of status to such person and cancelling removal in the case of such
person if that occurred and the person shall thereupon be subject to all
provisions of this chapter to the same extent as if the adjustment of
180
status had not been made.

Did the five-year statute of limitations for rescission also bar the
institution of exclusion proceedings against an alien under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1182(a)(19)?

175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Id. at 418, 420 (quoting Brandow v. United States, 268 F.2d 559, 565 (1959)).
Id. at 421-24.
Id. at 421-23.
9 . & N. Dec. 548, 551-57 (A.G. 1962).
8 U.S.C. § 1255(a).
§ 1256(a).
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The Board concluded that § 1256 applied to bar any subsequent
exclusion proceeding premised on fraud in the process of procuring that
status. It held that there was
no logical reason why Congress which desired to protect this status by
a statute of limitations, even though the status had been acquired by
one who was not eligible, should wish to withdraw that protection
because the alien had left the country and reapplied for admission on
181
the basis of the very adjustment of status which they had protected.
82
The Attorney General disagreed with this liberal construction. In
his view, the conferral of permanent residency under § 245 was not
meant to confer such a broad benefit on the alien, the effective insulation
from immigration consequences of all that came before acquisition of
that status. That section "was not designed either to 'benefit the alien
who has entered the United States in violation of the law' or to 'affect
the statutory standards of eligibility for immigration into the United
States."' 183 Clearly, Congress placed a temporal limit on when that status
could be rescinded by the Attorney General based on ineligibility at the
time of adjustment. 18 4 But Kennedy could not

agree that, in performing this narrow function, the time limitation
imposed on rescission by section 246 was intended to be read as
qualifying the express authority provided by the Act to deport or
exclude aliens on proper grounds without time limitation. Such an
extreme interpretation would require either specific statutory language
or at least a clear indication in the legislative history that Congress
185
intended the statute to be so read. There is neither.

Thus, the Attorney General read the statute as not barring "an exclusion
proceeding based upon the alleged fraudulent procurement of an entry
visa prior to his adjustment of status," even if more than five years had
lapsed since the adjustment itself.' 86
Kennedy's opinions in these cases were more of a mixed bag for
the alien. He remained focused, as always, on the human dimension of
these cases and the need to interpret the law in a practical fashion. As he
noted in S- & B-C-:

181. S-, 9 I. & N. Dec. at 550.
182. Id. at 553 ("I cannot agree that an adjustment of status under section 245 and the five-year
limitation on rescission provided in section 246 have the effects attributed to them by the special
inquiry officer and the [BIA].").
183. Id. at 554 (quoting S. REP. No. 2133, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., at 2).
184. See § 1256.
185. S-, 9 I. & N. Dec. at 554-55.
186. Id. at 557.
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Shutting off the opportunity to come to the United States actually is a
crushing deprivation to many prospective immigrants. Very often it
destroys the hopes and aspirations of a lifetime, and it frequently
operates not only against the individual immediately but also bears
heavily upon his family in and out of the United States. 187

These hopes should color the interpretation given, but could not dictate
it, just as the application of even a liberal construction will not always
result in relief. This principle animates the core of the decisions
addressing misrepresentation, focused as they are on whether the
misrepresentation was collateral to the admission determination or rather
concealed a basis on which the alien could or would have been excluded.
Two aliens found relief in this interpretation, another not. So, too, with
S- and the question of excludability and rescission. This may be the least
liberal construction Kennedy gave to a provision of the INA, but it is
eminently reasonable in light of the purpose of the statute and its text.
Adjustment of status was and is a benefit to be granted, and one that may
be rescinded in certain circumstances. But the granting of that status is
not a prospective free pass for all immigration transgressions that
preceded it. 188 It is of course a strict rule that may entail particularly
harsh consequences for long-term residents, but it is more in consonance
with the law as written than the Board's alternative construction.
Kennedy's approach across this whole range of cases can be
succinctly summarized. Where the intent of Congress and the language it
used was clear, he followed the statute to its letter even where that
interpretation may have entailed harsher consequences than other
ostensibly reasonable interpretations. But where Congress provided
space for true interpretation, and either a liberal construction of the
statute or a stricter interpretation could both be deemed reasonable,
Kennedy invariably favored liberal construction, animated by a humane
understanding of the stakes for the individual.
IV.

THE REFERRAL AUTHORITY IN RECENT DEMOCRAT
ADMINISTRATIONS

Contemporary uses of the referral authority have varied
considerably based on the political identity of the administration in
power. As noted in the Introduction, recent Republican administrations,
most notably the George W. Bush and Trump Administrations, have
used the authority as an integral component in advancing their
187. S- & B-C-, 9 I. & N. Dec. at 446 (citing Report of the President's Commission on
Immigration and Naturalization 177 (1953)).
188. S-, 9 I. & N. Dec. at 555.
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immigration policy objectives. 189 In contrast, use of the authority has
been virtually nonexistent in contemporary Democrat administrations,
and when it has been used it has been largely for nonsubstantive
dispositions, i.e., in cases where the Attorney General is performing a
190
This
more administrative function rather than an interpretive function.
recent
most
the
two
in
authority
referral
of
the
use
the
Part addresses
Democrat administrations, highlighting the de minimis role it played in
the advancement of immigration policy during this time.
A.

Referral in the Clinton Administration

Attorney General Janet Reno issued four decisions upon referral
during her service in the Clinton Administration. Three of these
decisions were effectively administrative, referring a decision by the
Board for her review, but ultimately remanding based on intervening
circumstances. The fourth decision, dealt with in this Part first, was
substantive, but met with a frosty reception in the courts of appeals and
ultimately failed to prevail as a guiding interpretation of the relevant
provision.
In 1996, as part of a broader overhaul and reform of the
immigration statute, Congress passed the Antiterrorism and Effective

Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"). 19 1 The AEDPA amended § 212(c) of the
INA by adding a final sentence, providing that this section shall not
apply to an alien who "is deportable by reason of having committed any"
192
Prior to the enactment
of a number of enumerated criminal offenses.
of AEDPA, Soriano was convicted of attempted criminal sale of a
which rendered him deportable under
controlled substance,

§ 1251(a)(2)(A)(iii), and an immigration judge declined to waive

193
deportability under section 212(c) in the exercise of his discretion.
While his administrative appeal was pending with the Board, AEDPA
was enacted, raising two questions regarding the reach of the
amendment to section 212(c): Did it apply to all pending proceedings,
and even if so, did it also apply to all pending applications for relief in
which there had not yet been a final decision at the time of enactment?
On the first question, the Board held that the lack of an effective date in

189. See supraPart I; Gonzales & Glen, supra note 6, at 897, 920.
190. See id. at 920.
191. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214
(1996) (codified in scattered titles of U.S.C.).
192. § 440(d), 110 Stat. at 1277 (referencing offenses "covered in" 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1251(a)(2XA)(iii), (B), (C), and (D), and "any offense covered by" 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(A)(ii)
"for which both predicate offenses are covered by" 8 U.S.C. § 125 1(a)(2)(A)(i)).
193. Soriano, 211. & N. Dec. 516, 517-18 (A.G. 1997).
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the statute itself meant that it applied without limitation to all
proceedings, not just those instituted after its effective date. 9 4 Other
provisions of AEDPA had clearly indicated effective dates, if different
than the enactment date, and the lack of such language regarding section
440(d) led inexorably to the conclusion that it applied to all proceedings
without limitation. 195 The opposite inference, however, governed when
assessing what applications the amendment applied to. The Board noted
that other limitations or changes to provisions providing for
discretionary relief applied to applications filed "before, on, or after" the
effective date of AEDPA. 19 6 No such language was included in section
440(d). The Board thus "interpret[ed] Congress' [s] omission of the
'before, on, or after' language in section 440(d) to indicate its intent that
aliens with applications pending on April 24, 1996, should not be
statutorily barred from section 212(c) relief by operation of the
AEDPA." 197 Soriano thus remained statutorily eligible for a waiver
under section 212(c), although the Board did uphold the immigration
judge's denial of that waiver in the exercise of discretion. 19 8
Attorney General Reno disapproved of the Board's conclusion that
section 440(d) did not apply to all applications pending as of AEDPA's
effective date, "conclud[ing]
that the amendment to INA
§ 212(c) ... applies to proceedings ... in which an application for relief
under section 212(c) was pending when AEDPA was signed into
law." 199 The Attorney General based this holding on her conclusion that
the law did not act retroactively. First, the "relief sought in a section
212(c) application, waiver of inadmissibility, is prospective in nature."2 00
Second, "Congress's modification of section 212(c) operates to
eliminate the discretionary authority of the Attorney General to grant
relief in certain cases, and, thus, its effect is to remove jurisdiction,"
which constituted an exception to the presumption against retroactive
effect. 201 There was, then, no compelling argument that application of
section 440(d) to Soriano's pending application for relief would involve
a retroactive effect. 202 Nonetheless, the Attorney General did fashion a
limited remedy for similarly situated aliens:

194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

Id. at 519-20.
Id. at 519.
Id. at 519-20 (citing
Id. at 520.
Id. at 521.
Id. at 534.
Id. at 537.
Id.
Id. at 540.

§ 413(g),

110 Stat. at 1269-70).
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To eliminate even the remote possibility that an alien who had a
colorable defense to deportability may have conceded deportability in
reliance on the availability of section 212(c) relief, I direct the
[Executive Office for Immigration Review] to reopen cases upon
petition by an alien who conceded deportability before the effective
date of AEDPA for the limited purpose of permitting him or her to
contest deportability.

203

Soriano had a short shelf life. It was rejected in the federal courts of
appeals almost immediately, with those courts concluding that Congress
had not intended the amendment to apply retroactively to cases pending
2
at the time AEPDA was enacted. 04 The Department of Justice
subsequently promulgated regulations adopting an even more generous
view of the application of the amendments than the Board's initial
decision, exempting all pending proceedings from the new bar, not just
those where an application for relief had been filed prior to the effective
date of AEDPA. 201 And, of course, the Supreme Court ultimately
concluded that section 212(c) relief "remains available for
aliens ... whose convictions were obtained through plea agreements and
who, notwithstanding those convictions, would have been eligible for
206
§ 212(c) relief at the time of their pleas under the law then in effect. "
Twice more Attorney General Reno issued decisions tied to
amendments made to the INA in 1996, this time by the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act ("IIRIRA"), but
each decision was more a matter of administration than substance. In
Farias, the Board upheld an immigration judge's decision granting a
waiver of deportability to an alien charged with alien smuggling,
because at the time she sought the waiver she was married to the
2 07
The Board's interpretation
individual she had assisted in smuggling.

of the waiver provision, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1)(E)(iii), was permissive,
allowing a waiver even in circumstances where the alien was not

married to the qualifying individual at the time the smuggling
occurred.2 08 IIRIRA amended this statutory provision to explicitly

203. Id.
204. See, e.g., Henderson v. INS, 157 F.3d 106, 129-30 (2d Cir. 1998); Goncalves v. Reno, 144
F.3d 110, 126-33 (1st Cir. 1998).
205. See Margaret H. Taylor, Behind the Scenes of St. Cyr and Zadvydas: Making Policy in the
Midst of Litigation, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 271, 286-87 (2002) (citing 66 Fed. Reg. 6,436-38 (Jan.
22, 2001)).
206. See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 326 (2001); Patrick J. Glen, Interring the Immigration
Rule of Lenity, NEB. L. REv. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 44).
207. Farias-Mendoza, 211. & N. Dec. 269, 271-75 (B.I.A. 1996).
208. See id. at 271, 274-75; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1)(E)(iii) ("The Attorney General may,
in his discretion for humanitarian purposes, to assure family unity, or when it is otherwise in the
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provide that the covered familial relationship must exist "at the time of
the offense." 209 Attorney General Reno referred and vacated the Board's
decision, remanding for further consideration of the applicant's
eligibility for a waiver in light of IIRIRA's amendment; a waiver that
was ultimately denied given the amended language and the fact that the
applicant had not been married to the individual at the time of her
smuggling offense. 210
In N-J-B-, the majority of the Board, sitting en banc, determined
that another provision of IRIRA, the so-called "stop-time rule" for
calculating periods of continuous physical presence and residence in the
United States, could be applied to pretermit an application for
suspension of deportation, notwithstanding the fact that proceedings
against the alien had been instituted before the enactment and effective
date of IIRIRA. 211 The Attorney General referred and vacated the
Board's decision in July 1997, but took no adjudicatory action. 2 12 The
referral was likely precipitated by the administration's disagreement
with the Board's decision, and its intent to resolve the matter through the
introduction of clarifying legislation. 213 President Clinton did
subsequently sign into law the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central
American Relief Act ("NACARA"), 214 which revised certain parts of
IIRIRA's transitional rules, including the rule on which the Board had
based its decision in N-J-B-.2 15 For the most part, however, the relevant
revisions had the effect of codifying the Board's vacated majority
decision in N-J-B-, and the Board thus effectively reissued that holding

public interest, waive application of clause (i) [pertaining to deportability] in the case of any alien
lawfully admitted for permanent residence if the alien has encouraged, induced, assisted, abetted, or
aided only the alien's spouse, parent, son, or daughter (and no other individual) to enter the United
States in violation of law.").
209. Farias-Mendoza, 211. & N. Dec. at 280.
210. See id. at 279-81.
211. 22 I. & N. Dec. 1057, 1063-68 (B.I.A. 1997) (reviewed by Att'y Gen. 1997, 1999); see
Patrick J. Glen & Alanna R. Kennedy, The Strange and Unexpected Afterlife of Pereira v. Sessions,
34 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 13 (2019) (recounting the history of N-J-B-).
212. See N-J-B-, 22 . & N. Dec. at 1088.
213. See Immigration Issues, IMMIGRS.' RTS UPDATE (Nat'l Immigr. L. Ctr., Los Angeles,
C.A.), Jul. 23, 1997, at 1 ("Reno announced in a press statement that the Clinton administration will
introduce legislation to ensure that individuals who applied for suspension of deportation prior to
the IRIRA's Apr. 1, 1997, effective date ... continue to be eligible for suspension of
deportation.").
214. Pub. L. No. 105-100, 111 Stat. 2193 (1997), amended by Pub. L. No. 105-139, 111 Stat.
2644 (1997).
215. See Nolasco-Tofmo, 22 I. & N. Dec. 632, 634 (B.I.A. 1999).
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in Nolasco-Tofino,216 holding that the amended rule applied to all
217
charging documents whenever issued.
Along with its amendments to IIRIRA's transitional rules, however,
NACARA also provided for a new relief provision that was meant to
benefit certain qualifying aliens from Central American countries,
218
Congress's
including Nicaragua (N-J-B-'s country of citizenship).
amendments foreclosed one avenue of relief for N-J-B-, but opened up
another, and in August 1999, Attorney General Reno remanded the case
to the Board for it to consider an intervening motion to reopen filed by
the alien regarding relief under the newly enacted statutory provisions of
2 19
NACARA pertaining to adjustment of status.
Finally, Attorney General Reno was the first of three Attorneys
General to refer the case of R-A-, a Guatemalan woman who had been
the victim of severe domestic violence and sought asylum and related
protection in the United States.2 2 0 An immigration judge granted asylum,
making two determinations: first, that R-A- was persecuted on account
of her membership in a particular social group, defined as "Guatemalan
women who have been involved intimately with Guatemalan male
companions, who believe that women are to live under male
domination," 221 and second, that "through [R-A-'s] resistance to his acts
of violence, her husband imputed to the respondent the political opinion
that women should not be dominated by men, and he was motivated to
commit the abuse because of the political opinion he believed her to
hold." 2 22 The Board reversed on both grounds. Focusing on the first
here, the Board concluded that the proposed social group was not shown
to be a
group that is recognized and understood to be a societal faction, or is
otherwise a recognized segment of the population, within Guatemala.
[R-A-] has shown neither that the victims of spouse abuse view
themselves as members of this group, nor, most importantly, that their
216. Id. at 641-42.
217. See Angel-Ramos v. Reno, 227 F.3d 942, 946-47 (7th Cir. 2000); Patricia Flynn & Judith
Patterson, Five Years Later: Fifth Circuit Case Law Developments Under the Illegal Immigration

Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, 53 BAYLOR L. REV. 557, 588-89 (2001).
218. See Edward R. Grant, Laws of Intended Consequences: IIRIRA and Other Unsung
Contributors to the Current State of Immigration Litigation, 55 CATH. U. L. REV. 923, 927 (2006)
(noting effective amnesty and relief provisions of the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American
Relief Act); Elwin Griffith, The Transition Between Suspension of Deportation and Cancellationof
Removal for Nonpermanent Residents Under the Immigration and Nationality Act: The Impact of

the 1996 Reform Legislation, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 79, 129-30 (1999) (noting similar).
219. See N-J-B-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1057, 1088-89 (A.G. 1999).
220. See R-A-, 22 L & N. Dec. 906, 906-07 (B.I.A. 1999).
221. Id. at 911.
222. Id.
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male oppressors see their victimized companions as part of this
group. 223

Nor did the Board view members of the proposed group as at risk
because of their membership in the proffered group:
If group membership were the motivation behind his abuse, one would
expect to see some evidence of it manifested in actions towards other
members of the same group .... On the basis of this record, we
perceive that the husband's focus was on the respondent because she
was his wife, not because she was a member of some broader
collection of women, however defined, whom he believed warranted
the infliction of harm. 224

The Board did note that the INS was free to halt deportation in the
exercise of its discretion, but that R-A-'s recourse to asylum was
unavailing. 225
The most immediate reaction to the Board's decision was
regulatory. In December 2000, the Department of Justice promulgated a
proposed rule to amend certain regulations pertaining to asylum
eligibility, motivated in large part by a desire to reverse the Board's
reasoning. 22 6 The proposed rule clarified that there is no requirement that
a persecutor seek to harm all members of a particular social group. 227
The rule also proposed case-by-case adjudications for particular social
groups premised on private harm based on "broadly applicable
principles," leaving further refinement for successive subsequent
adjudications. 228 In light of the proposed rule, Attorney General Reno
vacated the Board's decision on the eve of the Bush Administration and
remanded for reconsideration, directing the Board to stay further
consideration until the proposed rule had been finalized. 22 9 Attorneys
General Ashcroft and Mukasey subsequently referred the case, as the
regulatory process stagnated, with the latter ultimately directing the
Board to adjudicate the case. 2 0 R-A- ultimately obtained asylum based
223. Id. at 918.
224. Id. at 920-21 (emphasis added).
225. Id. at 928 ("The solution to the respondent's plight does not lie in our asylum laws as they
are currently formulated.").

226. See Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,588, 76,588-89 (Dec. 7, 2000).
227. Id. at 76,592-93; see id. at 76,597-98 ("Evidence that the persecutor seeks to act against
other individuals who share the applicant's protected characteristic is relevant and may be
considered but shall not be required.").

228. Id. at 76,595.
229. R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 906 (A.G. 2001).
230. See R-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 694, 694 (A.G. 2005) (referring and remanding "for
reconsideration following final publication of the proposed rule published at 65 Fed. Reg. 76,588
(Dec. 7, 2000). The BIA should reconsider the decision in light of the final rule."); R-A-, 24 I. & N.
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231
although the domestic violence
on stipulations by the government,
asylum issue had a less satisfying resolution for immigration advocates:
Attorney General Sessions' decision in A-B-, which returned to the main
2 32
themes the Board had enunciated in the initial decision in R-A-.
In eight years, the Clinton Administration never really utilized
Attorney General referral as a tool to implement its immigration policy
agenda. Part of the reason is evident from the face of the decisions that
Attorney General Reno actually did issue, all of which addressed, in one
way or another, intervening amendments to the immigration laws:
statutory reform was the order of the day. Both AEDPA and IIRIRA
were enacted in 1996, and constituted dramatic reforms to the existing
statutory structure. 23 3 Narrower and more targeted statutes were enacted
2 34
The Clinton-era referrals were
in 1994, 1997, and 1998, as well.
the major 1996 enactments:
following
operation
largely a clean-up
where Board precedent had
cases
remands for further consideration in
been overruled or placed into question. In this context, Soriano stands
out as an attempt to interpret a provision of the 1996 amendments, but
even that related only to the temporal scope of what Congress enacted
and not to a truly substantive issue of interpretation with prospective
importance.
Noting the legislative context of the Clinton Administration does
not excuse, necessarily, the failure to integrate referral into its
policy-making apparatus. It is true that any administration will have
limited capacity to address each and every conceivable issue that may
arise, and that it did make sense to focus time and energies on the
broader statutory reforms enacted during this period. But by doing so,
the Clinton Administration left issues on the table that would have been
amenable to resolution through referral. The domestic violence

Dec. 629, 630-31 (A.G. 2008) ("In light of these developments and the fact that the proposed rule
cited by Attorney General Reno never has been made final, I have decided to lift the stay so that the
Board can revisit the issues in Matter of R-A- and related cases and issue new decisions.
Accordingly, the Board should now proceed as it sees fit with its reconsideration of Matter of R-Aand the other cases involving similarly situated aliens.").
231.

See Barbara R. Barreno, Note, In Search of Guidance: An Examinationof Past, Present,

and Future Adjudications of Domestic Violence Asylum Claims, 64 VAND. L. REV. 225, 249-50
(2011).
232. A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 334-39 (A.G. 2018).
233. See, e.g., Goncalves v. Reno, 144 F.3d 110, 115-16 (1st Cir. 1998) ("Congress
substantially altered the immigration landscape by enacting two significant statutes, AEDPA and
IIRIRA.").
234. See Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat.
2681-538 (1998); Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act, Pub. L. No. 105-100,
tit. II, 111 Stat. 2193 (1997), amended by Pub. L. No. 105-139, 111 Stat. 2644 (1997); Immigration
and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-416, 108 Stat. 4305 (1994).
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particular social group question was certainly one where the
administration could have taken a harder adjudicatory line rather than
rely on the promulgation of a proposed rule in the waning days of the
Clinton presidency. Chinese family-planning policies and to what extent
those who opposed such policies should be able to establish eligibility
for asylum is another area where the administration punted on
adjudicatory resolution.235 Here, Congress ultimately resolved the
question in 1996 with an amendment to the refugee definition. 236 In
short, the administration's focus on statutory reform obscured smaller
steps that could have been taken by the administration, in conjunction
with those broader ends, to effectuate its immigration policy.
B.

Referral in the Obama Administration

In contrast to the Clinton Administration, which occurred during a
long period in which Attorney General referral was a rarely used
mechanism, the Obama Administration took office on the heels of one of
the most active users of the authority since enactment of the original
INA in 1952. The George W. Bush Administration utilized the authority
to issue sixteen decisions during its eight years in office, a pace not seen
since the days of Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson. 237 With attempts
at statutory reform stagnating in this period, unlike the Clinton era,
referral could have been a natural forum through which to implement
policy preferences through interpretation of key provisions in the INA.

235. See Julie Tang, The United States' Immigration Laws: Prospectsfor Relieffor Foreign
Nationals Seeking Refuge from CoerciveSterilization or Abortion Practicesin Their Homelands, 15

ST. LoUis U. PUB. L. REv. 371, 384-85 (1996) (noting referral of family-planning issues to Attorney
General Reno, as well as her refusal to consider the question on the merits); Gao v. Waters, 869 F.
Supp. 1474, 1478 n.6 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (noting rescission of the order granting review); see also
Dong v. Slattery, 870 F. Supp. 53, 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) ("[T]he Attorney General has the express
authority to formally review any BIA decision ... and thus has been free to modify or overrule
Chang since it was decided over five years ago. In the intervening years, the BIA has consistently
applied and explicitly endorsed Chang . . . while the Attorney General conspicuously has refrained
from repudiating Chang.").
236. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(B) ("[A] person who has been forced to abort a pregnancy or
to undergo involuntary sterilization, or who has been persecuted for failure or refusal to undergo
such a procedure or for other resistance to a coercive population control program, shall be deemed
to have been persecuted on account of political opinion, and a person who has a well-founded fear
that he or she will be forced to undergo such a procedure or subject to persecution for such failure,
refusal, or resistance shall be deemed to have a well-founded fear of persecution on account of
political opinion."); see also Brian Edstrom, Assessing Asylum Claims from Children Born in
Violation of China's One-Child Policy: What the United States Can Learnfrom Australia, 27 Wis.
INT'L L.J. 139, 155-56 (2009) (noting addition of subsection (B) to section I101(a)(42) and the
desire to target claims of persecution arising under China's one child policy).
237. See Gonzales & Glen, supra note 6, at 857-58.
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Instead, despite being well aware of the authority's possibilities, the
Obama Administration failed to take advantage of the mechanism.
Attorney General referral was on the agenda as soon as the Obama
Administration took office, thanks to two decisions issued by Attorney
General Mukasey in the closing six months of the Bush Administration,
Compean and Silva-Trevino. In Compean, Attorney General Mukasey
issued a decision addressing two dimensions of ineffective assistance of
238
First, addressing whether
counsel claims in removal proceedings.
there was a due process right to effective assistance of counsel, he
concluded that no such Fifth Amendment right existed, as that
Amendment applies only against the government, and any ineffective
assistance of counsel would be by private counsel with an insufficient
nexus to state action. 239 Second, he nonetheless concluded that the Board
retained discretion to reopen proceedings based on a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, and imposed a new substantive and procedural
framework to govern such claims, superseding the prior standards the
24
Board had announced in Lozada. o
Attorney General Holder vacated the decision soon after assuming
office, concluding that the constitutional ruling was unnecessary to the
decision, and that rulemaking would be instituted in order to establish a
24
framework for consideration of such claims going forward. ' The
Attorney General also directed the Board to apply the extant Lozada
requirements in the interim, while directing Department of Justice
litigators to maintain their pre-Compean litigation position in the courts
of appeals (a position that argued there is no constitutional right to
effective assistance of counsel in immigration proceedings, and thus no
24 2
Although
due process violation where counsel performs ineffectively).
mostly a placeholder decision, the opinion also resolved an open issue,
holding that the Board does have discretion to consider an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim that arises after entry of the final order, for
instance, in the failure to timely file a petition for review with the
238. Compean, 24 . & N. Dec. 710, 710-11 (A.G. 2009).
239. Id. at 716-20 (citing, inter alia, Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976); Jackson
v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974)); see Patrick J. Glen, The Nonconstitutional
Character of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims in Immigration Proceedings: A Brief

Comment on Afanwi v. Mukasey, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. POSTSCRIPT 1, 8-10 (2008).
240. Compean, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 727-28, 732-39; see Daniel Changshik Moon, Current
Development-Development in the Judicial Branch-Former Attorney General Mukasey Eliminates
Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel in Immigration Proceedings, 23 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 245,

248-50 (2008).
241. Compean, 25 . & N. Dec. 1, 2-3 (A.G. 2009).
242.. Id. at 3; see Brief for the Respondent in Opposition at 16-17, Merchant v. Holder, 134 S.
Ct. 1276 (2014) (No. 13-400), 2013 WL 6913345; Brief for the Respondent at 10-12, Afanwi v.
Holder, 558 U.S. 801 (2009) (No. 08-906), 2009 WL 2625869.
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appropriate court of appeals. 243 The regulatory fix noted in the decision
was never finalized.
Silva-Trevino had a longer post-Bush Administration existence. 24
At issue was whether immigration adjudicators were bound to the
strictures of the categorical approach in determining whether an alien
had been convicted of a "crime involving moral turpitude." The
categorical approach directs adjudicators to "look 'not to the facts of the
particular prior case,"' but to whether the "'crime of conviction'
categorically fits within the 'generic' federal definition of a
corresponding" offense. 2 45 In cases where the statute of conviction is
indivisible, this is straightforward and requires only a comparison of the
statutory elements with those of the generic offense. 24 6 If a single statute
instead sets out multiple, distinct offenses, an adjudicator may apply the
so-called "modified categorical approach," which permits consultation
of a limited range of documents, "such as indictments and jury
instructions, to determine which alternative [offense] formed the basis of
the defendant's prior conviction." 247 Once the offense of conviction has
been established, the adjudicator then applies the categorial approach to
that specific offense. 248 Attorney General Mukasey concluded that the
INA did not compel the same limitations in immigration proceedings,
and instituted a third-step in the inquiry permitting immigration judges
to "consider evidence beyond [the record of conviction] if doing so is
necessary and appropriate to ensure proper application of the [INA's]
moral turpitude provisions." 2 49 Despite a push from immigration
advocates both for reconsideration by Mukasey and vacatur by

243. Compean, 25 1. & N. Dec. at 3; see Jean Pierre Espinoza, Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel in Removal Proceedings, Matter of Compean, and the FundamentalFairnessDoctrine, 22

FLA. J. INT'L L. 65, 91-92 (2010) ("Holder temporarily decided an issue not decided prior to
Compean. The BIA had not yet resolved whether its discretion to reopen removal proceedings
includes the power to consider claims of ineffective assistance of counsel based on conduct of
counsel that occurred after the BIA entered a final order of removal. Holder resolved this issue by
granting the Board this discretion.").
244. 24 I. & N. Dec. 687 (A.G. 2008).
245. Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 190 (2013) (quoting Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez,
549 U.S. 183, 186 (2007) (citation omitted)).
246. See Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2248 (2016) ("The comparison of elements
that the categorical approach requires is straightforward when a statute sets out a single (or
'indivisible') set of elements to define a single crime. The court then lines up that crime's elements
alongside those of the generic offense and sees if they match.").
247. Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 257 (2013).
248. See Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2249 (noting that after applying the modified categorical
approach, "[t]he court can then compare that crime, as the categorical approach commands, with the
relevant generic offense").

249. Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 698-99.
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Holder, 250 the decision survived and was vigorously defended in the
courts of appeals by the Department of Justice, perhaps owing to the
noxious facts which involved the repeated molestation of a young girl by
251
a sixty-four-year-old man.
That vigorous defense faltered on a succession of adverse decisions
in the courts of appeals, which rejected recourse to documents outside
52
the scope originally contemplated by the categorical approach.
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions clarifying application of the
categorical and modified categorical approaches also undermined the
logic of the Attorney General's decision, while placing into doubt the
permissibility-even in the immigration context-of moving beyond the
2 53
These developments
record of conviction as traditionally defined.
General Holder:
Attorney
by
decision
the
of
ultimately led to the vacatur
In view of the decisions of five courts of appeals rejecting the
framework set out in Attorney General Mukasey's opinion-which
have created disagreement among the circuits and disuniformity in the
Board's application of immigration law-as well as intervening
Supreme Court decisions that cast doubt on the continued validity of
the opinion, I conclude that it is appropriate to vacate [that] opinion in
its entirety.254

A different wrinkle on the categorical approach was presented in
Chairez.255 Following the Supreme Court's decision in Descamps,
disagreement arose over when a statute could be treated as divisible and

250. See, e.g., Memorandum of Law of Amici Curiae American Immigration Lawyers
Association et al., in Support of Reconsideration at 1-3, Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687 (A.G.
2008) (No. A013 014 303).
251. See, e.g., Mary Holper, The New Moral Turpitude Test: Failing Chevron Step Zero, 76
BROOK. L. REv. 1241, 1303 (2011) (noting that decision could be seen "as a triumph of common
sense (deport the child molester when a judge knows those were the facts) over creative lawyering
molester avoids
(because the record of conviction does not show those facts, the child
deportation)"); Michael S. vastine, From Bristol, to Hollywood, to a Land Far, Far Away:

Considering the Immigration Consequences of Statutory Rape, 7 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 289,

of
318 (2010) (noting that Silva-Trevino involved "highly unfavorable facts involving a molestation
man").
old
year
a child by a sixty-four
252. See Silva-Trevino v. Holder, 742 F.3d 197, 199-203 (5th Cir. 2014); see also
Olivas-Motta v. Holder, 746 F.3d 907, 910-11, 915-16 (9th Cir. 2013); Prudencio v. Holder, 669
Cir.
F.3d 472, 480-82 (4th Cir. 2012); Fajardo v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 659 F.3d 1303, 1307-10 (11th
v.
Mata-Guerrero
see
But
2009).
Cir.
(3d
473
462,
F.3d
582
2011); Jean-Louis v. Att'y Gen.,
Bobadilla
Holder, 627 F.3d 256, 260-61 (7th Cir. 2010) (accepting permissibility of the third step);
v. Holder, 679 F.3d 1052, 1056-57 (8th Cir. 2012) (accepting similar).
253. See Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 190-91 (2013); see also Kawashima v. Holder,
132 S. Ct. 1166, 1172 (2012); Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S. 563, 575-76, 581-82 (2010).
254. Silva-Trevino, 261. & N. Dec. 550, 553 (A.G. 2015).
255. 26 I. & N. Dec. 349, 351 (B.I.A. 2014).
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thus amenable to analysis under the modified categorical approach. 256
Some courts believed that textual analysis alone was relevant, and thus
that a statute was divisible if phrased as presenting alternative elements,
even if those distinct "elements" of the offense may not have been
elements in the formal sense in which that term was often used. 257 Other
courts held that textual analysis was insufficient, since the alternative
statutory phrases could be distinct means of committing a single offense
rather than a recitation of distinct offenses each with its own set of
elements. 258 To ascertain whether the statute actually embodied distinct
offenses, and was thus divisible, these courts would look to state law to
determine whether jury unanimity was required regarding the statutory
"element"; if so, the element was an element in the true sense of the term
and the statute was divisible, but if not, the ostensible element was a
means by which a single offense could be committed, and thus indicated
an indivisible statute. 25 9
The Board waded into this thicket in Chairez, holding that for a
statute to be divisible, i.e., to encompass distinct offenses as opposed to
different means to commit a single offense, jury unanimity was required
regarding the statutory elements. 26 0 Attorney General Lynch referred the
case to herself for review, and directed briefing on "the proper approach
for determining 'divisibility' within the meaning of Descamps v. United
States."26 1 In particular, whether Descamps requires "that a criminal
statute be treated as 'divisible' for purposes of the modified categorical
approach only if, under applicable law, jurors must be unanimous as to
the version of the offense committed." 262 Shortly after, however, the
Supreme Court itself resolved the issue, holding in Mathis that distinct
elements are required in order to conclude that a statute is divisible, and
that mere alternative means of committing a single offense is
insufficient. 263 In light of that decision, the Attorney General lifted the
stay of proceedings and remanded for further action by the Board in light
of Mathis.2 6

256. See id. at 350-52 (demonstrating that "divisibility" from Descamps was at issue).
257. See, e.g., United States v. Trent, 767 F.3d 1046, 1060-61 (10th Cir. 2014).
258. See, e.g., Rendon v. Holder, 764 F.3d 1077, 1084-85 (9th Cir. 2014).
259. See id. at 1085-86 (noting that the term "elements" refers to "those circumstances on
which the jury must unanimously agree").
260. Chairez, 26 I. & N. Dec. 349, 354 (B.I.A. 2014) ("If Utah does not require such jury
unanimity, then it follows that intent, knowledge, and recklessness are merely alternative 'means'

by which
261.
262.
263.
264.

a defendant can discharge a firearm, not alternative 'elements' of the discharge offense.").
570 U.S. 254 (2013); Chairez, 261. & N. Dec. 686, 686 (A.G. 2015).
Chairez, 26 I. & N. Dec. 686, 686 (A.G. 2015).
See Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2257 (2016).
Chairez, 26 I. & N. Dec. 796, 796 (A.G. 2016).
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Finally, Dorman arose in the context of the Obama
Administration's developing approach to litigation under the Defense of
5
Marriage Act ("DOMA"). 2 6 The administration ultimately came to the
conclusion that DOMA was not constitutional and that it would not be
defended in the federal courts, but that it would nonetheless still be
2
applied in appropriate circumstances. " The "application" part of the
equation was at issue in Dorman, where the alien was denied
cancellation of removal because he lacked a qualifying relative for
purposes of establishing "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship"
should he be removed, despite being in a legal same-sex civil union
267
Attorney General Holder referred and
under New Jersey State law.
vacated the Board's decision, but declined to resolve any question
presented on his own.2 68 Instead, he remanded proceedings to the Board
for it to consider several questions he posed, including: (1) whether
Dorman qualified as a "spouse" under New Jersey Law; (2) whether, in
the absence of DOMA, he would qualify as a "spouse" under the INA;
and (3) whether, if he did have a qualifying relative, he would be able to
fulfill the "exceptional and unusual hardship" standard for cancellation
of removal.2 69 Dorman was subsequently married under New York law
270
and obtained administrative closure of his removal proceedings.
Despite not technically resolving an issue of substance, the decision sent
a signal regarding how to approach same-sex issues raised in removal
proceedings.
the Clinton Administration, the Obama
unlike
Again,
to utilize the referral authority was not the
failure
Administration's
product of pushing massive legislative reform, which arguably occupied
the immigration-policy space that could have otherwise been devoted to
referral. Instead, the Obama Administration focused on administrative
programs implemented through policy memoranda-DACA, instituted
in June 2012,271 DAPA, instituted in November 2014,272 and other
2 73
Even this focus obscures
prosecutorial discretion-related initiatives.
more than it reveals; it was nearly four years into the administration
before DACA was instituted, and in that time the referral authority had
265.
266.

See 25 I. & N. Dec. 485 (A.G. 2011).
See United States v. windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 753-54 (2013).

267.

See Joseph Landau, DOMA and Presidential Direction: Interpreting and Enforcing

Federal Law, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 619, 639-40 (2012).
268. Dorman, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 485.
269. See id.
270. See Landau, supra note 267, at 640 n.92.
271. See Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, supra note 3.
272. See Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, supra note 4.
273. See Memorandum from John Morton, supra note 5.
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not been used for any substantive decision. Leaving aside the point that
these initiatives could not have totally occupied the space the
administration could have devoted to immigration policy, they were on
their face nonpermanent programs subject to the vagaries of politicsrescission by an incoming administration. DAPA was enjoined and
ultimately rescinded by the Trump Administration, while DACA, too,
was rescinded with litigation based on the rescission reaching the
Supreme Court.2 74 The program lives on at the moment, but further
litigation seems likely if not certain.
In other words, the Obama Administration trafficked-in internal
policy initiatives that were peculiarly subject to who occupied the
executive branch, while ignoring adjudicatory resolutions to other issues
that would have had a better chance of more permanently changing the
immigration law landscape. It is of course true that adjudications are
subject to challenge before the federal courts, and thus could have been
abrogated there, similar to the litigation against both the DACA and
DAPA programs. And it is also true that an Attorney General opinion
may be vacated by a successor, as Attorney General Holder had done in
Compean soon after taking office. 275 The latter concern has not been a
substantial feature of the referral authority during its history, and
certainly not in circumstances where there have been no intervening
changes in law or federal court interpretation that would upset the prior
interpretation. And the former also seems less compelling; any review of
the Attorney General's decision would be under the deference
framework of Chevron, meaning even if challenged, the courts should
uphold the decision so long as it is a reasonable and permissible
construction of the statute. 276
And, as with the Clinton Administration, the focus on DACA and
DAPA did not exhaust the immigration policy possibilities. For instance,
the administration challenged liberal constructions of the INA by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit all the way to the
Supreme Court. 277 In Escobar, the Board held that a child had to meet
the eligibility criteria for cancellation of removal on her own, and could
not impute the parent's period of lawful permanent residence to herself
for purposes of meeting those criteria. 278 The Ninth Circuit then rejected
this rule, opining that in "allowing imputation, we merely implement the
countervailing and co-equal congressional policy of recognizing that
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.

Dep't of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1903 (2020).
Compean, 25 I. & N. Dec. 1, 1-3 (A.G. 2009).
See Holper, supra note 251, at 1255-27.
See Holder v. Martinez-Gutierrez, 566 U.S. 583, 586-88 (2012).
See Escobar, 24 I. & N. Dec. 231, 233-34 (B.I.A 2007).
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presence in the United States of an extended length gives rise to such
strong ties to the United States that removal would result in undue
hardship." 279 Ultimately, the Government prevailed before the Supreme
Court, which held that the Board's interpretation was reasonable and
permissible. 280 The issue in Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio was more
esoteric, and involved the question of when a child who reaches the age
of majority before a visa is available to him may retain his priority date
28
and convert his visa petition to another qualifying category. 1 The
Board had resolved the issue with a strict interpretation that provided
relief to a limited class of aliens. 282 The Ninth Circuit rejected that
interpretation, 283 but again the Supreme Court reversed, finding the
agency decision a reasonable and permissible construction of ambiguous
statutory language. 284 The Board decisions the government defended in
these cases were reasonable, but that is not the point; they were not the
only possible interpretations of the. statutory language, as the Supreme
Court noted, 2 ' and were in fact among the most restrictive possible
readings of the statute. 28 6 It is not difficult to imagine Attorney General
Kennedy reaching out and resolving these cases differently through use
of the referral authority.
And there were, of course, additional adjudicatory issues that could
have been resolved, and resolved consistent with the administration's
desire to implement a more humane immigration policy. The question of
when and how private persecution could give rise to a colorable basis for
asylum was still open in many contexts important to advocatesdomestic violence, gang-based claims, and construing family as a social
the
of
components
discrete
The
instance.
for
group,
particular-social-group analysis could have benefited from Attorney
General interpretation. 287 Application of the post-departure bar to
279. Cuevas-Gaspar v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 1013, 1029 (9th Cir. 2005).
280. See Holder, 566 U.S. at 597-98.
281. Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, 573 U.S. 41, 45-46 (2014).
282. See Wang, 25 I. & N. Dec. 28, 38 (B.I.A. 2009).
283. See Cuellar de Osorio v. Mayorkas, 695 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
284. See Scialabba, 573 U.S. at 75.
285. See id. at 75 ("This is the kind of case Chevron was built for. Whatever Congress might
have meant .. . it failed to speak clearly. Confronted with a self-contradictory, ambiguous provision
in a complex statutory scheme, the Board chose a textually reasonable construction consonant with
its view of the purposes and policies underlying immigration law."); Holder v. Martinez-Gutierrez,
566 U.S. 583, 592 (2012) ("Taken alone, the language of § 1229b(a) at least permits the Board to go
the other way-to say that 'the alien' must meet the statutory conditions independently, without
relying on a parent's history.").
286. Cuellar de Osorio, 573 U.S. at 73 (rejecting the argument that "the BIA acted
unreasonably in choosing the more restrictive reading").
287. See Elizabeth A. Rossi, A "Special Track" for Former Child Soldiers: Enactinga "Child
Solider Visa" as an Alternative to Asylum Protection, 31 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 392, 436 (2013)
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reopening proceedings had resulted in a conflict in the circuits that
would have been amenable to Attorney General resolution. 288 There
would have been no shortage of issues on which to expend energies had
the administration so desired, even before its later-stage myopic focus on
DACA and related initiatives.
V.

REFERRAL IN THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION

Immigration issues have been at the forefront of national debate for
at least the last three administrations, with little reason to believe they
will recede in importance during the current administration. The Biden
Administration will have at its disposal all the traditional executive
branch tools for advancing its agenda, including Executive Orders,
internal memoranda, and rulemaking. Even in the midst of all these
possibilities, it should not lose sight of the possibilities of referral. This
concluding Part argues that there are many issues that would benefit
from use of the referral authority, notwithstanding other avenues through
which the administration can and should press its agenda. Thus, Subpart
A begins by noting why referral may be peculiarly capable of resolving
certain issues, while flagging potential areas that could be the focus of
the authority. Subpart B turns to procedural issues, advancing potential
reforms of the authority that could make it more effective.
A.

The Why and What ofReferral

The referral authority is unquestionably broad and could touch any
interpretive issue under the INA and its implementing regulations. But
that does not exhaust the range of issues the Biden Administration may
want to address, and in fact, its priorities may be better addressed
through other executive and legislative branch mechanisms. This was
true in the Obama Administration, where prosecutorial discretion and
programmatic initiatives were prioritized. Referral took a backseat
because it was not capable of effectuating the kind of policy options with
which the administration was most concerned with.
Rather than ignoring referral, however, the Biden Administration
can use it to bolster its policy agenda in areas where more substantial
reform-legislative, regulatory, and programmatic-is not strictly
necessary. This is the "why" of referral for the new administration:
because the INA and its regulations contain many provisions which are
(raising referral in the context of clarifying the "social visibility" prong of the particular social
group analysis).
288. See Rachel E. Rosenbloom, Remedies for the Wrongly Deported: Territoriality,Finality,
and the Significance of Departure,33 U. HAW. L. REV. 139, 177 (2010).
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ambiguous and which may lie outside the scope of future reforms, the
Attorney General should exercise his authority to issue a controlling
interpretation of the law to guide agency adjudicators. This possibility is
compelling regardlessof what broader reforms the administration might
undertake. For instance, the possibility of issuing liberalizing
constructions of relief provisions is important whether or not DACA
remains in existence. So, too, are similar constructions of inadmissibility
and deportability provisions, including addressing the scope of the
criminal grounds of removability. And in some ways, the benefits of
referral are heightened in a context where the administration is able to
secure either or both legislative and regulatory reforms. It would have
the benefit of not only promulgating provisions sketching the contours
of the reformed immigration system, but also maintaining the final
interpretive authority over the new provisions, to the extent they are
ambiguous, via the Attorney General's referral authority. There is thus
no reason to believe that referral could not be a valuable component of
the incoming administration's immigration policy agenda, regardless of
what else it might be hoping to accomplish in this area.
Examples of the contexts in which referral could prove valuable
illustrate this point. First, the Attorney General could elect to review
categories of cases that touch on authorities that Congress has
specifically given to him-the ability to grant (or deny) relief in the
exercise of discretion, regardless of whether other eligibility criteria
have been met. Asylum, for instance, may be denied to an alien who
otherwise establishes statutory eligibility for relief, because that relief is
ultimately discretionary. 289 The same is true for cancellation of removal
for both lawful permanent residents and nonpermanent residents,290
adjustment of status, 291 and a variety of other waivers and forms of relief
from removal.2 92 What would be at issue in any case that turns on a
discretionarydetermination would be authority specifically given to the
289. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A) ("The Secretary of Homeland Security or the Attorney
General may grant asylum to an alien who has applied for asylum in accordance with the
requirements and procedures established ... under this section .... ").
290. See id. § 1229b(a) ("The Attorney General may cancel removal in the case of [a lawful
permanent resident] who is inadmissible or deportable from the United States" if the alien meets
certain eligibility criteria); id. § 1229b(b) ('The Attorney General may cancel removal of, and
adjust to the status of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, an alien who is
inadmissible or deportable from the United States" if the alien meets certain eligibility criteria).
291. See id. § 1255(a) (allowing that the status of an alien "may be adjusted by the Attorney
General, in his discretion and under such regulations as he may prescribe, to that of an alien
lawfully admitted for permanent residence").
292. See, e.g., id. § 1182(h) (providing for the discretionary waiver of certain criminal grounds
of inadmissibility); id. § 1182(i) (providing for a discretionary waiver for an alien inadmissible for
fraud or willful misrepresentation of a material fact).
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Attorney General by Congress to exercise his judgment in determining
whether relief should be granted. An incoming Attorney General could
address the question of discretion through the referral process, making
clear to his delegates at the Board and in the immigration courts how
that discretion should be exercised in close cases that present aliens who
are statutorily eligible for relief but who nonetheless have negative
equities that will factor into the question of whether relief should be
granted. Or the Attorney General could act more broadly still, and direct
referral in any case in which relief was granted or denied based on an
ultimate exercise of discretion. This would allow the Attorney General
to act as the final adjudicator in all cases touching on discretion,
ensuring that where statutory eligibility has been met, any grant or denial
of relief that would turn on judgment is made by the actor to whom
Congress has directly delegated the responsibility of exercising that
judgment.
Second, even confined to recent cases where a dissent has been
registered by a Board member, there would be a wide range of
substantive issues amenable to resolution through referral. In J.M.
Acosta, the Board split 2-1 on whether IIRIRA's enactment of a new
definition of "conviction" requires that the alien exhaust direct appeals
before the conviction may be considered for immigration purposes. 293
The majority, finding the statute ambiguous, held that the "long-standing
requirement that a conviction must attain sufficient finality before
immigration consequences attach ... survived the enactment of the
IIRIRA." 294 The dissent, in contrast, found the plain language of the
statute conclusive in resolving the question, and because the INA's
definition is met regardless of the pendency of direct review of the
conviction, would have held that IIRIRA's definition does not require
finality before immigration consequences may be imposed. 29 Beyond
the disagreement this question has engendered at the Board, in J.M.
Acosta and other cases, 296 the courts of appeals have also issued
conflicting decisions; some have concluded or hinted the fmality

293.

J.M. Acosta, 271. & N. Dec. 420, 431, 434 (B.I.A. 2018); see 8 U.S.C.

§

1101(a)(48XA)

("The term 'conviction' means, with respect to an alien, a formal judgment of guilt of the alien

entered by a court or, if adjudication of guilt has been withheld, where-(i) a judge or jury has
found the alien guilty or the alien has entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere or has admitted
sufficient facts to warrant a finding of guilt, and (ii) the judge has ordered some form of
punishment, penalty, or restraint on the alien's liberty to be imposed.").
294. J.M. Acosta, 271. & N. Dec. at 431.
295. Id. at 438 (Malphrus, Bd. Member, concurring in part, dissenting in part).
296. See Cardenas-Abreu, 24 I. & N. Dec. 795, 807 (B.I.A. 2009) (en banc).
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2 97
requirement survived enactment of the IIRIRA, while the majority has
298
leaned towards the conclusion that finality is no longer a requirement.
The plain language of the statute may foreclose a more liberal
construction, although the Board majority in J.M. Acosta did base its
interpretation on a finding of ambiguity and compelling policy reasons
2
for maintaining finality as a requirement for a conviction. " In any
event, given this range of disagreement in the agency and courts of
appeals, Attorney General referral would provide an opportunity to
consider the divergent views and resolve the question, at least for
purposes of agency adjudications.
The Board has also issued companion decisions on application of
the "material support" provision of the INA, which renders an alien
inadmissible and ineligible for a range of discretionary relief and
30 0
The INA
protection based on "engage[ment] in terrorist activity."
defines "engage in terrorist activity" to include "commi[ssion of] an act
that the actor knows, or reasonably should know, affords material
support, including a safe house, transportation, communications, funds,
transfer of funds or other material financial benefit, false documentation
or identification, weapons (including chemical, biological, or
radiological weapons), explosives, or training," for certain designated
terrorism-related reasons. 301 The Board has concluded that this provision
302
contains no exception for "material support" provided under duress, a
decision that has been upheld by the courts of appeals as a permissible
interpretation of the statute. 303 It has also recently concluded, over a
dissent, that there is no quantitative threshold for when support becomes
material, and that all "material support" falls within the scope of this
3
provision even if in some sense de minimis. 04 In contrast, the dissent
would have interpreted "material" to qualify support, by imposing a
more-than-incidental or de minimis requirement on support before it

297. See Orabi v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 738 F.3d 535, 540-41 (3d Cir. 2014); see also United States
v. Garcia-Echaverria, 374 F.3d 440, 445 (6th Cir. 2004); cf Walcott v. Chertoff, 517 F.3d 149, 154
(2d Cir. 2008).
298. See Planes v. Holder, 652 F.3d 991, 996-97 (9th Cir. 2011); Puello v. Bureau of
Citizenship & Immigr. Services, 511 F.3d 324, 332 (2d Cir. 2007); United States v. Saenz-Gomez,
472 F.3d 791, 793-94 (10th Cir. 2007); Montenegro v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 1035, 1037 (7th Cir.
2004) (per curiam); Moosa v. INS, 171 F.3d 994, 1009 (5th Cir. 1999); see also Griffiths v. INS,
243 F.3d 45, 49-51 (1st Cir. 2001).
299. See J.M. Acosta, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 427-29.
300. See generally 8 U.S.C. § I182(a)(3)(B).
301. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI).
302. See M-H-Z-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 757, 764 (B.I.A. 2016).
303. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Sessions, 884 F.3d 107, 109 (2d Cir. 2018); Annachamy v. Holder,
733 F.3d 254, 267 (9th Cir. 2013); Alturo v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 716 F.3d 1310, 1314 (11th Cir. 2013).
304. A-C-M-, 27I. &N. Dec. 303, 307-11 (B.I.A. 2018).
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would constitute "material support." 305 As with the duress exception
holding, the courts of appeals have deferred to the Board's conclusion. 3 06
The uniform view of the courts of appeals may make this issue a poor
one for Attorney General resolution, upsetting what would be consensus.
At the same time, the obligation to establish controlling interpretations
of the law rests with the Attorney General, and to the extent there is
room for disagreement about the proper interpretation it would be his to
resolve (should he so desire). 307
A divided Board was on the other side of circuit opinion in Castillo
Angulo. 308 In order to establish eligibility for cancellation of removal for
lawful permanent residents, the applicant must establish, inter alia, that
he or she "has resided in the United States continuously for 7 years after
having been admitted in any status." 30 9 The Fifth and Ninth Circuits had
held that an alien who is "waved through" at a port of entry has been
"admitted in any status," regardless of whether they were lawfully
entitled to be admitted at the time they entered the United States. 310 The
Board rejected this interpretation of the statute, holding that the alien
must possess some lawful immigration status at the time they are waved
in, in order to be "admitted in any status." 31' A dissenting member
would have adopted the rule of the Fifth and Ninth Circuits, and held
that a "wave through" admission constitutes an admission "in any
status," even if the alien lacked any lawful basis on which to be admitted
at that moment. 312 This issue, resolved on the basis of the majority's
conclusion that the statute is ambiguous, would be amenable to
resolution by the Attorney General via referral. 3 13 Although not an issue
of broad importance-limited, as it is, to a discrete provision of a
distinct form of relief, and implicating an even smaller subset of cases
where the initial admission would have been a "wave through" where
the applicant lacked any lawful basis for admission-it would still

305. See id. at 313-15 (wendtland, Bd. Member, dissenting).
306. See, e.g., Hincapie-Zapata v. U.S. Att'y General, 977 F.3d 1197, 1199, 1201 (11th Cir.
2020); Rayamajhi v. Whitaker, 912 F.3d 1241, 1244-45 (9th Cir. 2019); Hosseini v. Nielsen, 911
F.3d 366, 376-77 (6th Cir. 2018); see also Sesay v. Att'y Gen. U.S., 787 F.3d 215, 221 (3d Cir.
2015) (upholding the conclusion that "low-level" support constituted "material support"); Barahona
v. Holder, 691 F.3d 349, 356 '(4th Cir. 2012) (upholding similar); Singh-Kaur v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d
293, 296-301 (3d Cir. 2004) (upholding similar).
307. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
308. Castillo Angulo, 27 I. & N. Dec. 194, 200, 202 (B.I.A. 2018).
309. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(2).
310. See Saldivar v. Sessions, 877 F.3d 812, 816-19 (9th Cir. 2017); Tula-Rubio v. Lynch, 787
F.3d 288, 295-96 (5th Cir. 2015).
311. See Castillo Angulo, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 194, 196-202.
312. Id. at 204-06 (Pauley, Bd. Member, concurring in part, dissenting in part).
313. Id. at 196-97 (noting ambiguity of the statute).
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provide an opportunity for a potentially liberal construction of the
statute.
There would also be significant opportunities to clarify the law
relating to criminal offenses. The agency is entitled to deference in
interpreting ambiguous provisions in the aggravated felony definition,
for instance, an area where the Attorney General could intervene and
establish a permissible generic definition of an otherwise undefined
offense. 314 The Board has recently interpreted several criminal
provisions in decisions that provoked dissents, including the scope of the
31
what
term "prostitution" in the aggravated felony provision,
3 16
constitutes an offense of stalking under the deportability provision,
and the elements of the "receipt of stolen property offense" under the
31
aggravated felony provision. " Other ambiguous terms that have
engendered significant litigation include the "sexual abuse of a minor"
provision of the aggravated felony definition, and the "crime of child
abuse" ground of deportability, both of which could be clarified in scope
318
Clarification of general
and regarding specific applications.
terminology would also be beneficial, as in what offenses qualify as an
31 9
offense "relating to" specific categories of crime.

314. See Soto-Hernandez v. Holder, 729 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2013); Mugalli v. Ashcroft, 258
F.3d 52, 56-58 (2d Cir. 2001); Restrepo v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 617 F.3d 787, 795-96 (3d Cir. 2010);
Espinal-Andrades v. Holder, 777 F.3d 163, 168-69 (4th Cir. 2015); Alwan v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d
507, 513-15 (5th Cir. 2004); Velasco-Giron v. Holder, 773 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014); Spacek v.
Holder, 688 F.3d 536, 538-39 (8th Cir. 2012); Renteria-Morales v. Mukasey, 551 F.3d 1076, 1081
(9th Cir. 2008); Balogun v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 425 F.3d 1356, 1361 (1lth Cir. 2005).
315. See Ding, 27 I. & N. Dec. 295, 299-300 (B.I.A. 2018); see also 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(43XK)(i) (defining aggravated felony to include "an offense that--[] relates to the
owning, controlling, managing, or supervising of a prostitution business").
316. See Sanchez-Lopez, 27 I. & N. Dec. 256, 260-61 (B.I.A. 2018); see also 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) ("Any alien who at any time after admission is convicted of a crime of domestic
violence, a crime of stalking, or a crime of child abuse, child neglect, or child abandonment is
deportable.").
317. See Deang, 27 I. & N. Dec. 57, 59 (B.I.A. 2017); see also § 1101(a)(43)(G) (defining
aggravated felony to include "a theft offense (including receipt of stolen property) or burglary
offense for which the term of imprisonment [is] at least one year").
318. See § 1101(a)(43)(A); § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i); Restrepo v. Att'y Gen. of U.S., 617 F.3d 787,
793-94 (3d Cir. 2010); Velasco-Giron v. Holder, 773 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014).
319. § 1101(a)(43)(Q) ("[A]n offense relating to a failure to appear by a defendant for service
of sentence if the underlying offense is punishable by imprisonment for a term of 5 years or
more .... "); § 1 101(a)(43XR) ("[A]n offense relating to commercial bribery, counterfeiting,
forgery, or trafficking in vehicles the identification numbers of which have been altered for which
the term of imprisonments is at least one year...."); § 1 101(a)(43)(S) ("[A]n offense relating to
obstruction of justice, perjury or subornation of perjury, or bribery of a witness, for which the term
of imprisonment is at least one year .... "); § 1101(a)(43)(T) ("[A]n offense relating to a failure to
appear before a court pursuant to a court order to answer to or dispose of a charge of a felony for
which a sentence of 2 years' imprisonment or more may be imposed .... ").
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The point here is not to exhaustively detail the issues that the Biden
Administration could address if it so desired, but simply to sketch the
possibilities. Assuming Robert Kennedy as a guide, even this overview
shows the potential of referral for an administration inclined to liberal
interpretation. It could define eligibility criteria for relief liberally,
concluding, for instance, that de minimis support under duress to a
terrorist organization is not "material" and thus not disqualifying, or that
a "wave through" admission is sufficient in gauging the seven years'
presence required for cancellation of removal for lawful permanent
residents. Of course, as already noted, some provisions might
nonetheless require the stricter interpretation, as the definition of
conviction seems to require. But even that is in line with the broad
purpose of referral and is not inconsistent with an otherwise liberal
inclination; as Kennedy's experience shows, the point is that the
Attorney General must be guided by the law, but that where the law does
admit of multiple reasonable interpretations, it rests with him to alight
upon the one he deems most in accord with the purpose and policy of the
provision.
B.

InstitutionalizingReferral

To realize the potential of Attorney General referral, it should be
institutionalized by the incoming administration. In the initial transfer of
functions, the regulations did provide for a "Special Assistant in Charge"
of immigration functions, 32 0 and this position seems to have been filled
at least at certain points in the past. 321 The first regulation governing
referral also contemplated the referral of a broader range of cases to the
Attorney General, including all in which discretionary relief had been
granted under former section 19(c) of the INA, all in which a dissent had
been recorded, and any in which the Board certified "a question of
difficulty" was involved.32 2 A dedicated official coupled with a broader
range of issues susceptible to essentially mandatory referral ensured a
significant usage of the referral authority following the transfer of
functions to the Department of Justice. 3 2 3
In order to make referral a central part of its immigration policy, the
Biden Administration should return to the spirit of referral's early days.
320. See Delegation of Powers and Definition of Duties, 5 Fed. Reg. 2,454, 2,454 (July 1,
1940) (referring to the Special Assistant in Charge).
321. See, e.g., C-, 1 I. & N. Dec. 631, 633 n.2 (B.I.A. 1943) (A.G. 1944) (noting a
memorandum from a "Special Assistant to the Attorney General").

322. See 8 C.F.R. § 90.12 (1940).
323. See generally Gonzales & Glen, supra note 6, at 857 (noting pace of decisions between
1940 and 1952, as well as the drop off in frequency beginning with the Eisenhower Administration).
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Broadening the scope of referral would be the likely first step. Through
rulemaking, the administration could implement changes to the cases for
which referral would be required. As noted above, the administration
could direct referral in all cases where the agency decided the ultimate
question of relief based on an exercise of discretion, a rule that would
harken back to the initial referral regulation. It could also, in light of the
cases where disagreement on interpretive issues has divided the Board,
mandate referral of any case in which a Board member registers a
dissent; again, an operating principle embodied in the initial rule. These
changes would unquestionably increase the pace of referrals to the
Attorney General and would do so in situations where his statutorily
granted authority is most at issue-those involving discretionary
judgments regarding relief and those that require a definitive
interpretation of potentially ambiguous statutory language. The balance
of the existing regulation would remain, ensuring additional avenues of
referral-through certification by the Chairman of the Board, relevant
officials in the Department of Homeland Security, and by the Attorney
General himself.
To ensure that the higher volume of cases is adequately dealt with
upon referral, the Attorney General should appoint a dedicated Special
Assistant to handle adjudicatory matters. This role is currently filled by
the Office of Legal Counsel ("OLC"), and for that reason suffersattorney advisors in OLC are generalists with little to no subject matter
expertise on immigration matters.3 24 There is also little likelihood that an
OLC attorney could fulfill a dedicated role to immigration matters of
this kind, and no reason why the function should exist in OLC rather
than in the Attorney General's Office itself.
The Special Assistant would be charged with review of referred
matters in the first instance, including determining whether the matter
actually merits intervention by the Attorney General; referral is, after all,
a mechanism to bring a case to the attention of the Attorney General, but
it does not require an adjudication of the underlying merits of the
case.1 5 If a matter were accepted for review, the Special Assistant would
be charged with functions similar to a judicial clerk's-reviewing
incoming pleadings, consulting with the Attorney General about the
324. See, e.g., Cornelia Pillard, Unitariness and Myopia: The Executive Branch, Legal
Process, and Torture, 81 IND. L.J. 1297, 1310 (2006) ("OLC is staffed with legal generalists, not
individual-rights experts, and they typically lack particular familiarity with the institutional
conditions that foster or, alternatively, help to prevent rights violations.").
325. See, e.g., C-Y-Z-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 693, 693 (A.G. 2004) (denying to review a case
referred by the Commissioner of the INS); see also Zhang v. Slattery, 55 F.3d 732, 741 (2d Cir.
1995) (noting Attorney General Reno's decision declining to decide the merits of a case that had
been referred to her for decision).
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disposition of the case, and drafting the opinion itself. In this fashion, the
Attorney General could more fully fulfill the potential of referral, as
there would be an individual whose portfolio focused exclusively on the
referral and decision of cases. Moreover, with such a dedicated official,
the manner of referral could also be expanded. The Attorney General
could, for instance, implement a dedicated email address through which
aliens could flag their cases for review. There is nothing inappropriate
about requests that the Attorney General self-refer cases, 326 and this
could open up avenues whereby the Attorney General would be
presented with additional opportunities to exercise discretion under the
INA (for instance, in assessing hardship questions under various relief
provisions).
VI.

CONCLUSION

Institutionalizing and mainstreaming referral may seem like an odd
suggestion, coming after four years of concerted criticism from many
who may well fill the ranks of the incoming administration. But it makes
significantly more sense than the alternative-disclaiming any recourse
to referral simply because of disagreement with the substantive decisions
prior administrations have issued pursuant to the authority. That is
especially true where the authority is a neutral mechanism for advancing
immigration policy; it is not inherently "conservative" or "restrictionist,"
and can meet the goals of advancing a liberal immigration policy when
wielded by an Attorney General who is so inclined. That is true
objectively, but this Article has also advanced a specific example of just
such a use of the authority, that of former Attorney General Robert
Kennedy. Kennedy's pragmatic and humane approach to the
adjudication of immigration issues should serve as a model to the
incoming administration. So conceived, the referral authority can be an
important facet of the Biden Administration's immigration policy
agenda.

326. See C-, 4 I. & N. Dec. 130, 133 (A.G. 1950) (noting that "[t]he alien, through
counsel,... filed a petition with the Attorney General requesting the relief denied by the [INS] and
by the [BIA]"); cf Pierre, 14 I. & N. Dec. 467, 471 (B.I.A. 1973) (noting, but denying, a request by
alien's counsel to refer the case to the Attorney General); Garcia-Castillo, 10 I. & N. Dec. 790, 793
(B.I.A. 1964) (noting same); E- 6 I. & N. Dec. 388, 391 (B.IA. 1954) (noting same); see also Bah
v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 99, 110 n.14 (2d Cir. 2008) (noting requests from politicians and
non-governmental organizations that the Attorney General refer a Board decision to himself for
decision).
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